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ARE PUBLIC FACILITIES DIFFERENT
FROM PRIVATE ONES?: ADOPTING A
NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Bradford C. Mank*

ON

I.

INTRODUCTION

September 26, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in

United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste
Management Authority to decide the important issue of whether
local governments may require that all waste in their jurisdiction be sent
to a publicly-owned waste facility and thereby discriminate equally
against both local and out-of-state private firms.1 Although the Constitution's Commerce Clause only expressly grants Congress the authority to
regulate interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has developed a dormant Commerce Clause doctrine ("DCCD") that interprets the Clause to
grant federal courts an implied authority to invalidate state or local laws
that discriminate against out-of-state goods or firms.2 In applying this
doctrine, the Court has adopted an overly broad per se test that invalidates any state or local law that theoretically discriminates against out-ofstate firms, even if there is no evidence that the law has actual discriminatory effects and even if the law discriminates similarly against most instate firms. 3 The Court's simplistic, free-market approach to the DCCD
fails to balance the local benefits of these laws and undermines the Constitution's federalist values. 4 In deciding United Haulers,the Court hopefully will adopt a pragmatic approach that is more sensitive to the needs
of local governments struggling with serious waste issues.
In 1994, the Supreme Court in C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown
held that a local government "flow control" ordinance, requiring all solid
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O.
Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Tel: 513-556-0094; Fax
513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank my Cincinnati colleagues for their helpful comments at a presentation of the paper, especially Michael Solimine and Chris Bryant.
I thank the Harold C. Schott Fund for financial support. I thank Elizabeth Arens for her
research assistance.
1. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 35
(2006) (mem.).
2. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 44, 56-57 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 34, 114, 303 and accompanying text.
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waste in its jurisdiction to be sent to a single privately operated transfer
station, constituted per se discrimination against out-of-state businesses
seeking to haul or dispose of that waste and therefore violated the
DCCD; this was the case even though the only challenger to the law was
a local business. 5 The Court did not directly address whether a state or
local government could enact a similar flow control scheme if the government itself owned the waste facility.
In 2006, the Second and Sixth Circuits split over whether municipalities
or states may enact flow control ordinances that force waste haulers
within their political jurisdiction to send all waste to government facilities
and prohibit the export of waste to out-of-state disposal sites but that
discriminate equally against in-state and out-of-state private firms. In
United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste Management Authority ("United Haulers I"), the Second Circuit held that a flow
control ordinance requiring all solid waste to be sent to county-owned
processing sites does not discriminate against out-of-state businesses because private in-state businesses are equally excluded. 6 The Second Circuit further held under the Pike balancing test 7 that the benefits of the
public flow control scheme outweighed the burdens of its complete prohibition on export of waste to other states.8 In National Solid Waste Management Association v. Daviess County, however, the Sixth Circuit held
that public facilities are subject to the same non-discrimination analysis
used in Carbone and specifically rejected the Second Circuit's reasoning
in its earlier United Haulers I decision. 9 The Sixth Circuit argued that the
majority opinion in Carbone rejected any distinction between publicly
and privately-owned landfills but instead focused on whether a "flow control" ordinance discriminated against out-of state interests either by
preventing out-of-state firms from participating or by hoarding waste so
that it could not be sent to other states.' 0 The Sixth Circuit contended
that only the four concurring and dissenting justices in Carbone made the
distinction between private and public operation of waste facilities. 1 In
light of the clear split between the Second and Sixth Circuits, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue
of whether public waste facilities are different.
Because the per se discrimination test is overly broad, it is time for the
Court to re-think its Carbone decision. The split in the circuits regarding
whether flow control ordinances focusing exclusively on publicly-owned
5. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkson, 511 U.S. 383, 386, 394 (1994).
6. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150,
157-60 (2d Cir. 2006) ("United Haulers I"), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 35, 35 (2006).
7. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see infra notes 49, 64-65
and accompanying text.
8. United Haulers 11, 438 F.3d at 160-63.
9. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 904, 906-07, 90912 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 446 F.3d 647 (2006), petition for cert. filed, 2006 WL
2619953 (June 28, 2006) (No. 06-359).
10. Id. at 909-12.
11. Id. at 911-12.
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waste facilities are different from those that discriminate among privately
operated ones may finally lead the Court to refine, re-think or even overrule its Carbone decision. One of the justices in the five-member majority in the Carbone decision, Justice Thomas, has subsequently changed his
approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 2 In a 2005 Commerce
Clause decision, American Trucking Association v. Michigan Public Service Commission, Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, stated that
"'[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense and has proved virtually unworkable in application,' and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state
statute. ' 13 Another member of the Carbone majority, Justice Scalia, has
also argued that the Court should abolish the DCCD, but he appears to
give greater weight to stare decisis than Justice Thomas and thus is less
14
likely to repudiate Carbone.
Whether the Supreme Court adopts the Second or Sixth Circuit's approach has enormous practical significance. Although state protectionist
programs are generally inefficient, flow control ordinances are economically efficient in many cases, because they provide incentives for local
governments to build necessary facilities such as recycling facilities or incinerators. 15 In United Haulers II, numerous municipal, county, regional
and state waste associations and authorities throughout the nation 16
joined amici briefs supporting the flow control ordinance at issue in that
case. 17 By contrast, the private waste industry favors the Sixth Circuit's
approach, subjecting publicly owned facilities to the same per se discrimination test as private firms. 18 Although private industry argues that the
flow control ordinances often increase the cost to consumers of waste
12. Environmental Policy Alert, Industry May Ask High Court to Resolve Split on
'Flow Control' Laws, (March 1, 2006), Inside Washington Publishers, available at http://
www.InsideEPA.com, subscription required, also available at LEXIS, All News database.

13. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) and Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539
U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
14. Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("On stare decisis grounds, however, I
will enforce a self-executing, "negative" Commerce Clause in two circumstances: (1)
against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a
state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by
this Court."); see infra notes 38, 307-08 and accompanying text.
15. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,427-29 (1994) (Souter, J.,dissenting); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1253-79 (1998); Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful
Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM.
AND MARY L. REV. 1, 88 (2003).

16. Including Daviess County, Kentucky, which subsequently lost in the Sixth Circuit.
17. Brief for Bristol Resource Recovery Facility Operating Committee et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellees, United Haulers II, 438 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2024-

cv) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief]; Environmental Policy Alert, supra note 12 (reporting
municipalities strongly favor Second Circuit's approach to public waste facilities and flow
control ordinances).
18. Environmental Policy Alert, supra note 12 (reporting private industry strongly favors Sixth Circuit's approach to public waste facilities and flow control ordinances).
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disposal compared to a free market, 19 the Second Circuit in its United
Haulers II decision, persuasively argued that the costs are outweighed by
the benefits, such as continuity of service, increased recycling, and dimin20
ished risk of liability for public governments.
The Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit's approach in its
United Haulers decisions as the first step in curbing the Court's overuse
of the per se test and reformulating the Pike test to make it more workable. Whenever a law does not discriminate between local and foreign
private firms, courts should apply the more deferential Pike review standard, not the per se standard, to determine whether the law imposes
more than incidental burdens on interstate commerce and whether the
law's benefits significantly outweigh any burdens to foreign interests.
Additionally, going beyond the analysis in the United Haulers decisions,
2
courts should examine whether the law is purposefully protectionist. '
Furthermore, when the burdens of local ordinances fall much more heavily on local customers or taxpayers than out-of-state interests, courts
should not apply a per se discrimination test but should instead establish
22
a rebuttable presumption that the law is valid under the Pike test.
Without overruling Carbone, the Supreme Court in United Haulers could
give more flexibility to local governments where a law does not favor
local private firms at the expense of out-of-state firms by using a combination of three tests: first, the Pike test as it was applied in the United
Haulers decisions; second, a purposefully protectionist standard; and,
third, a local burdens test.
II. THE DCCD AND FLOW CONTROL ORDINANCES
Part A will review the DCCD. Part B will discuss flow control ordi23
nances. Part C will examine the Carbone decision.
A. DCCD
The Commerce Clause expressly provides that "Congress shall have
Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the

several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'2 4 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Clause to imply "dormant" limitations that empower federal courts to invalidate state or local laws that burden the flow
of interstate commerce, even where Congress has not adopted regulations. 25 The DCCD "prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regula19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
United Haulers I, 438 F.3d at 161-63.
See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 383 (1994).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995);

Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Why the
"Zone of Interests" Test Should Not Apply to ConstitutionalCases, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 23, 26
(2006).
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tory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors. '26 Because it is an implied doctrine
based on Congress's presumed intent to prohibit economic protectionism
by states, Congress can override the DCCD if it enacts clear legislation
that authorizes local governments to adopt discriminatory measures, although Congress seldom overturns court decisions in this area.2 7 Since
1976, the Court has invoked the doctrine far more frequently than it had
in previous years, excluding tax cases.2 8
There are three main arguments for the DCCD. First, there is a strong
structural argument that local protectionist laws are contrary to the Constitution's implied framework of political union and cooperation among
states. 2 9 Second, some justify the DCCD by arguing that the framers of
the Constitution intended the Commerce Clause to promote free markets
by eliminating protectionist trade barriers, 30 yet several commentators argue the framers did not intend to create a national free market above all
considerations of state sovereignty. 31 Third, some argue that the DCCD
serves the representative process goal of preventing elected officials in
one jurisdiction from imposing burdens on people in other jurisdictions
who did not elect them. 32 The process approach, however, is difficult to
apply because a law may benefit some outsider groups, but harm other
foreign interests so that weighing its overall impact can be complicated. 33
26. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
27. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 408-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is within Congress'
power to authorize local imposition of flow control.").
28. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 43-44 (2003) (finding from "1953 through 1975, the Supreme Court decided only
eight [DCCD] cases involving state regulations other than tax measures," but the Court
decided ten cases between 1976 and 1981, and ten cases between 1986 and 1989).
29. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (stating the Constitution
"was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division");
Robert R. M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, EnvironmentalJustice, and the Interstate
Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1269 (1997).
30. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997); James D. Fox, Note, State
Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 175, 182-83 (2003); see infra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text.
31. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 1057 (3d ed.
2000) ("[T]he negative implications of the Commerce Clause derive principally from a political theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade."); Thomas K. Anson &

P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources,
59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 78-80 (1980); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35 (1982); Verchick, supra note 29, at 1270; see infra notes 17677 and accompanying text.
32. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,766-68, 767 n.2 (1945) ("[T]he Court has often
recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside
the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected."); Verchick, supra note 29, at
1250-55; but see Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571,

625-26 (1997) (arguing courts only "sporadic[ally]" invoke process theory for DCCD).
33. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 25256 (1995); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1160-67 (1986).
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Many judges and commentators have criticized the DCCD for undermining federalist principles by giving courts too much discretionary
power to strike down state and local laws that may have only a limited
effect on interstate commerce but significant local benefits. 34 State officials generally believe that the Court's DCCD is unduly restrictive and
stifles innovative state laws. 35 Justice Scalia has criticized the doctrine as
"arbitrary, conclusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text" 36
and has argued that the Court should abolish the doctrine, because it is
more appropriate for Congress to make legislative judgments about when
state laws are too discriminatory. 37 Justice Thomas has expressed similar
to be more willing to repudiate the Court's precedent
views and appears
38
in this area.
1. Market Participantor Market Regulator?
The DCCD prohibits state and local governments from using their
39
market regulatory authority to discriminate against out-of-state firms.
If a local government is acting as a market participant rather than a market regulator, however, its actions are exempt from the Commerce
Clause. 40 The Supreme Court has explained that the market participant
distinction "differentiates between a State's acting in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State's acting in the more general capacity of a
market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the
Commerce Clause. '4 1 For instance, a local government can, as a market
participant, subsidize an activity such as garbage collection, even if private competitors are at a disadvantage, because it is not using its regulatory authority to prevent competition from private firms, including
42
foreign ones.
2.

The Two-Part DCCD Test

If a local government is acting as a market regulator, the Court, since
1978, has used a two-part test to determine whether a law violates the
34. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the "expansive view of the Commerce Clause [that] calls into question a wide variety of state laws that have hitherto been thought permissible"); Lincoln L.
Davies, Note, If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 207,
248-52 (1999) (same).
35.

DOUGLAS

T.

KENDALL ET AL., REDEFINING

FEDERALISM: LISTENING

TO THE

82, 90 (Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004).
36. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 n.3 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
STATES IN SHAPING "OUR FEDERALISM",

37. See id. at 259-65.
38. S. Mohsin Reza, Comment, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: An Escape from the Dormant Commerce Clause Quagmire?, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1229, 1251-52 (2006).

39.
40.
41.
42.
1995).

Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-39 (1980).
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1288-89, 1291 (2d Cir.
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DCCD. 43 First, a court applies a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" to
laws that facially, purposefully or effectively discriminate against interstate commerce. 44 The Court has defined discrimination against interstate commerce as the "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
'45
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.
According to the Carbone decision, "The central rationale for the rule
against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object
is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies
'46
and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.
The Court presumes that all discriminatory local laws are invalid unless a
local government can prove no nondiscriminatory alternative exists to
achieve an important local purpose unrelated to economic protectionism. 47 In its only case upholding a discriminatory statute, the Court in
Maine v. Taylor held that the State of Maine could prohibit the importation of out-of-state baitfish as the only practicable means to prevent con48
tamination of its rivers by parasites and alien fish species.
Second, "where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental," a court applies the Pike balancing test to determine
whether a law's burdens on interstate commerce are "clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. ' 49 A court is much more likely to
sustain a regulation under the Pike test than under the per se rule. 50 A
fundamental problem with the Court's DCCD is that it has failed to establish a clear approach for cases that fit within the per se category or are
reviewed under the Pike standard, although the choice of the test is out51
come determinative.
3.

The Per Se Test for Discriminatory Laws

The Court applies the per se review test to three different types of discrimination. 52 First, the easiest example of invalid discrimination is a law
that facially discriminates by "differential treatment of in-state and outof-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."'53 Second, a court will invalidate a facially neutral law if it was en43. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Verchick, supra note
29, at 1249.
44. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624; Mank, supra note 25, at 26-27.
45. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); O'Grady,
supra note 32, at 578, 582-87.
46. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).

47. See id.;

KENDALL ET AL.,

supra note 35, at 81.

48. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148, 151 (1986); Mank, supra note 25, at 28.
49. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Mank, supra note 25, at
27; see infra notes 65, 253, 260 and accompanying text.
50. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 573-75.
51. Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 156-57, 170 (1997).
52. Mank, supra note 25, at 27; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 578-82.
53. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Mank, supra
note 25, at 27; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 578-81.
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acted by a legislative body with the purpose of economic discrimination. 54
Third, when a facially neutral law has obvious discriminatory effects, the
55
Court has reviewed it under the per se standard.
The Court's application of the per se test has not always been consistent. In several cases, the Court has stated that any magnitude of the
discrimination, no matter how small, makes a law invalid under the
DCCD. 56 In other cases, however, the Court has taken into account the
amount of discrimination.5 7 The Supreme Court has continued to assess
whether discriminatory taxes that theoretically favor local firms actually
harm out-of-state firms by examining whether the in-state and out-of58
state firms or goods compete in the same market.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court expanded its discrimination
analysis to strike down laws that have only attenuated, incidental, or even
theoretical impacts on interstate commerce and actually place greater
burdens on local residents. 59 Because it includes three different types of
discrimination, the Court's definition of discrimination in DCCD cases is
far broader than the definition of discrimination in Equal Protection
cases, which only prohibit laws with discriminatory purposes or intentions
but not ones with discriminatory effects. 60 Accordingly, a far greater
number of state and local laws are subject to judicial scrutiny under the
6
DCCD than under other constitutional doctrines. '
Professor Verchick has argued that the Court should abandon the per
se doctrine and instead weigh a law's relative burdens and benefits on
local residents and interstate commerce. 62 The Court, however, may be
unwilling to completely abandon the per se test, which rests on almost
54. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A finding that state legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of... discriminatory
purpose..."); Mank, supra note 25, at 27; Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping
Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful DiscriminationAgainst
Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1076-84 (2002) ("A statute is per se invalid if
it discriminates against interstate commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect.")
(discussing cases).
55. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275-76, 278-79 (1988) (invalidating reciprocal tax credit because it "in effect, tax[es] a product made by [Indiana] manufacturers at a rate higher than the same product made by Ohio manufacturers"); Mank,
supra note 25, at 27; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 581-82.
56. Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1994); Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992); O'Grady, supra note 32, at 586.
57. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994); O'Grady, supra
note 32, at 586 n.55.
58. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366
U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961); McGreal, supra note 15, at 1216-22.
59. Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 221, 242-56; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 575-76, 58287; Klein, supra note 28, at 48-52 (finding "that indeed the Court is expanding its view of
discriminatory purpose" in DCCD cases); C. M. A. McCauliff, The Environment Held in
Trust for Future Generationsor the DormantCommerce Clause Held Hostage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 645, 658-59 (1995).
60. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).
61. Verchick, supra note 29, at 1283-86; Jennifer L. Larsen, Comment, Discrimination
in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 854-57, 865-66 (2003-2004).
62. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 1304-09; see infra notes 63, 298, 402-03 and accompanying text.
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thirty years of precedent and is arguably easier to apply than a balancing
test. This Article proposes that courts should narrow their application of
the per se test to cases where a law discriminates between in-state and
63
out-of-state competitors.
4.

The Pike Balancing Test

If a law is not facially, purposefully, or effectively discriminatory
64
against out-of-state interests, a court applies the Pike balancing test.
The Pike decision stated that "where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. ' 65 In the Carbone decision, the Court implicitly narrowed
the range of cases in which it applies the Pike test.66 Lower federal
courts, however, have continued to apply the Pike test
in many cases be67
cause the Court has not explicitly changed the test.
The Pike Court provided only a vague explanation of how courts
should apply its balancing test. For example, the Court never explained
how courts should weigh "putative local benefits. '68 The Court stated:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter69
state activities.
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court explained that "incidental
burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when
a State legis'70
lates to safeguard the health and safety of its people.
The Court has conceded that it is frequently unclear whether a local
law with alleged discriminatory purposes or effects should be analyzed
under the per se or the Pike test. 71 As discussed in Part IV, the Court
should reformulate the Pike test by: (1) following the United Haulers decisions whenever a law does not discriminate between local and foreign
private firms; (2) examining whether the law is purposefully protectionist;
and (3) establishing a rebuttable presumption that the law is valid under
63. McGreal, supra note 15, at 1216-22.
64. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Mank, supra
note 25, at 28.
65. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Paula C. Murray & David B.
Spence, FairWeather Federalism and America's Waste Disposal Crisis,27 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 71, 77 (2003).
66. Cox, supra note 51, at 180-88 (arguing Carbone majority would have applied the
per se test to the facts in Pike).
67. Fox, supra note 30, at 198-204.
68. Id. at 188-90.
69. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Murray & Spence, supra note 65, at 77.
70. City of Philadelphia v.New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
71. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986);
Cox, supra note 51, at 170; Klein, supra note 28, at 43 ("These tests have engendered
confusion."); Mank, supra note 25, at 28-29.
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the Pike test when the burdens of local ordinances fall much more heavily

72
on local rather than out-of-state interests.

B.

SOLID WASTE PROBLEMS AND FLOW CONTROL SOLUTIONS

Since 1960, there has been a significant increase in the amount of
household municipal solid waste ("MSW") in the United States. 73 During

the 1980s, there was widespread concern that there would soon be a
shortage of disposal space. 74 By 1994, more than twenty states had en75
acted statutes authorizing local or regional flow control ordinances.

Congress, at least indirectly, encouraged local governments to adopt
flow control measures. In the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 ("RCRA"), 76 as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"), 77 Congress declared that "the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of state, regional, and local agencies ....
-78 RCRA encouraged
local governments to develop local, regional, and state plans to ensure the
safe disposal of MSW, stating that "disposal of solid waste ... without

careful planning and management [was] a danger to human health and
the environment. , 79 Although the statute does not explicitly promote the
use of flow control, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Carbone
72. See infra Pt. IV.
73. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") defines municipal solid
waste ("MSW") as nonhazardous household waste as well as some household hazardous
waste; "MSW-more commonly known as trash or garbage-consists of everyday items
such as product packaging, grass clippings, furniture, clothing, bottles, food scraps, newspapers, appliances, paint, and batteries." See U.S. ENvTn. PROT. AGENCY, MUNICIPAL SOLID
WASTE-BASIc FACTS, available at http://www.epa.gov/garbage/facts.htm [hereinafter
EPA, BASIC FACTS]. In 1960, the average American generated 2.7 pounds of MSW per
day, for a total of 88.1 million tons; by 2003, the average American created about 4.5
pounds of MSW per day, for a total of 236.2 million tons in 2003. Id.; Mank, supra note 25,
at 29.
74. Klein, supra note 28, at 8-9.
75. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 406 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 25, at 31.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
77. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4); see id. (giving states and local governments the primary
role in managing nonhazardous waste); Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have
Standing?: Democracy, Flow Control and a Principled ConstitutionalApproach to Municipal Solid Waste Management, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 187-95 (1993) (arguing RCRA
and federalist principles give local governments a primary role in solid waste
management).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2); see id. § 6941 (providing planning objectives for solid waste
management); id. § 6942 (identifying guidelines for state planning); id. §§ 6943, 6947 (listing criteria for approval of state plans); id. § 6946 (stating procedure for development and
implementation of state plans); H.R. Rep. No. 1491-94, at 40 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6278 (urging cooperation between federal and state governments in
developing solid waste plans); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978
(Oct. 9, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 256 (1993)) (detailing guidelines for solid waste planning); Natasha Ernst, Flow Control Ordinances in a Post-Carbone World, 13 PENN. ST.
ENvTL. L. REV. 53, 53 (2004); Laura Gabrysch, Casenote, Constitutional Law-Dormant
Commerce Clause-Flow Control Ordinances That Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 563, 589-90
(1995).
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acknowledged that RCRA's planning provisions and some of its legislative history suggests that Congress anticipated that states and local govsuch mechanisms to finance facilities to handle
ernments would use 80
increased waste loads.
Complying with RCRA's expensive requirements was a major factor in
leading many local governments to adopt comprehensive waste programs,
including flow control laws, to recycle or incinerate waste in addition to
disposing it in landfills. 81 In order of priority, RCRA encourages waste
82
reduction, recycling, and incineration over dumping waste in landfills.
Additionally, HSWA required the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to issue more stringent environmental rules for operating MSW
landfills, forcing many older landfills to close. 83 New MSW landfills are
safer but more expensive than the older landfills that they
larger and
84
replaced.
Flow control ordinances requiring all generators or haulers of local
waste to take it exclusively to designated facilities for processing or disposal are designed to provide governments with adequate revenues to pay
for expensive new landfills, recycling programs, or incinerators by guaranteeing them a minimum volume of waste to process. 85 Tipping fees are
often higher at incinerators and broad recycling facilities, because they
handle more difficult and expensive waste, while private competitors focus on cheap and easy to recycle materials such as cardboard. 86 Without
80. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 408-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I agree with amicus
NABL that these references [in RCRA and its legislative history] indicate that Congress
expected local governments to implement some form of flow control."); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 6942 (b) (1988) (requiring EPA Administrator to develop guidelines for state plans that
address present and future waste needs to plan appropriate facilities); id. § 6941; H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1491, at 10 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6248 (stating that "resource recovery facilities cannot be built unless they are guaranteed a supply of discarded
material"); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1491, at 34 (1976) ("This prohibition [on state or local laws
prohibiting long-term contracts] is not to be construed to affect state planning which may
require all discarded materials to be transportedto a particularlocation.") (emphasis added); Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 590-91.
81. Ernst, supra note 79, at 53-54, 64-71; McCauliff, supra note 59, at 650, 656-57.
82. Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 589 n.103 (citing OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 17
(1988)).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(b); Murray & Spence, supra note 65, at 74; Jeff Bailey, Waste Yes,
Want Not: Rumors of a Shortage of Dump Space Were Greatly Exaggerated, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2005, at cl. If states did not adopt a Subtitle D permit program to enforce the
EPA's rules, the EPA could enforce its own criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(2)(A); Mank,
supra note 25, at 30.
84. The number of landfills in the United States has decreased from 8,000 in 1988 to
1,767 in 2002, but the total capacity of landfills has remained relatively constant, because
new landfills are much larger on average than older landfills. See EPA, BASIC FACTS,
supra note 73; Murray & Spence, supra note 65, at 74-75, 84. Larger landfills are typically
more expensive overall, but their cost of disposing a ton of waste is usually much lower.
Bailey, supra note 82, at cl ("A 10,000-ton-a-year dump would cost $83 a ton to operate,
estimates Solid Waste Digest, while a 300,000-ton-a-year site's cost would be $14 a ton.");
Mank, supra note 25, at 30.
85. Ernst, supra note 79, at 53-54; Jason M. King, Note, Standing in Garbage: Flow
Control and the Problem of Consumer Standing, 32 GA. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1998).
86. McCauliff, supra note 59, at 649 n.11, 650-51, 653, 673.
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flow control ordinances, private firms are able to "skim" cheap and inexpensive waste, but the public is often left with the bill for the remaining
87
more expensive waste.
Additionally, flow control ordinances usually seek to reduce future municipal liabilities, to promote the public health and safety, and to meet
state waste reduction goals by encouraging less waste production and
greater use of recycling. 8 8 Although MSW regulated under RCRA's Subtitle IV is less dangerous than hazardous waste regulated under Subtitle
111,89 MSW landfills include many household products that contain dangerous wastes. 90 Waste reduction programs, such as recycling and incineration in flow control ordinances provide important public benefits by
reducing the total toxicity of waste and improving the environment. 91
C.

CARBONE: THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN A

FLOW

CONTROL ORDINANCE

1.

Majority Opinion

In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, a local waste operator
challenged a Clarkstown ("the Town") flow control ordinance, Local Law
9, requiring all non-recyclable, non-hazardous solid waste generated
within the Town or generated outside the Town and brought into the
Town to be processed at a designated transfer station before it could be
shipped outside the Town. 92 In 1989, Clarkstown entered into a consent
decree with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation in which the Town agreed to close its landfill, which had a history
of environmental violations, and build a new solid waste transfer station

on the same site. 93 The Town signed an agreement with a local private
contractor requiring the contractor to construct the station and operate it

87. Id.
88. Id. at 656.
89. Subchapter III of RCRA provides for "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous
waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (2000). Subchapter IV addresses wastes not considered
to be hazardous. See id. §§ 6941-6949; Murray & Spence, supra note 65, at 74 n.14.
90. Kirsten Engel, Reconsideringthe NationalMarket in Solid Waste. Trade-offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1481,
1488-89 (1995)
([M]any household products-such as household cleaners, automotive products, paint thinners, and pesticides--contain toxic constituents that would
force their regulation as hazardous wastes were they generated by industry.
Some of the most common products found in municipal solid waste are also
the most hazardous: Appliance batteries, fluorescent light bulbs, and thermometers contain mercury; steel-can solder and car batteries contain lead.);
Davies, supra note 34, at 262 ("Many landfills receive toxic and hazardous wastes as a part
of their municipal waste stream ....
These toxics often leak from the landfills, subsequently migrating into aquifers and drinking water supplies. Indeed, nearly twenty percent
of the nation's most toxic Superfund sites are former landfills.").
91. McCauliff, supra note 59, at 656.
92. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1994); Mank,
supra note 25, at 31.
93. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386-87.
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for five years. 94 Arguably, the privately run monopoly in Carbone was a
quasi-public facility, because the Town was entitled to purchase the facility after the private owner enjoyed a five-year monopoly on processing
waste. 95 To amortize the cost of the transfer station, the Town guaranteed a minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons per year and authorized the
contractor to charge haulers who deposited waste at the station a tipping
fee of $81 per ton, a rate which exceeded the disposal cost of unsorted
solid waste on the private market. 96 To effectuate the plan, the Town
enacted a flow control ordinance imposing fines of up to $1,000 and a
maximum of fifteen days in jail against any hauler who took
MSW from
97
the Town without having it being processed at the station.
C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a recycling facility in the Town and accepted waste from both within and outside the Town, including from outof-state sources. 98 After officials found that Carbone was shipping waste
from its facility within the Town to out-of-state landfills without having it
processed first at the transfer station, the Town sued Carbone in New
York state court for an injunction requiring Carbone to ship waste to the
designated facility. 99 The New York state courts held that the ordinance
did not violate the DCCD. 1°°
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that
the ordinance was subject to the per se standard because the Town
"hoarded solid waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of
the preferred processing facility."' 1 1 The Town argued that its export restriction was different from the import or export bans invalidated in prior
cases, because its flow control ordinance evenhandedly treated in-state
and out-of-state waste and waste facilities. 10 2 Twenty-three state attorneys general and numerous local governments filed amicus briefs in support of the Town. 10 3 Although the ordinance did not bar the import or
export of waste, the Court found that the article of commerce at issue "is
94. Id. at 387.
95. Id. at 387, 395-400 (Appendix containing Town of Clarkstown, Local Law No. 9 of
the year 1990; a local law entitled, "Solid Waste Transportation and Disposal.").
96. Id. at 387.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 387-88.
99. Id. at 388-89.
100. Id. at 389.
101. Id. at 390-92; Joi Elizabeth Peake, South Carolina Loses a Battle in the Hazardous
Waste Wars: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Invalidate South Carolina's Hazardous Waste Laws in Environmental Technology v. Sierra Club, 76 N.C. L. REV. 650, 673
n.155 (1998).
102. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390; Peake, supra note 101, at 673 n.155.
103. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 384. An empirical study found that the Supreme Court was
more likely to rule against a local government in DCCD cases when another government
filed an amicus brief supporting the local government, although this result may be due to
selection effects, because a government may file an amicus brief more often in cases in
which a local government may lose. Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American
Common Market: State and Local Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 Sup.
Cr. ECON. REV. 233, 267 n.117 (1999).
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not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and
disposing of it."104 Because the ordinance required Carbone to send the
non-recyclable portion of any out-of-state waste to the transfer station at
an additional cost, the Court found that the "flow control ordinance
drives up the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid
waste," although there was no evidence in the record that the law actually
increased costs for out-of-state persons. 10 5 For waste originating in the
Town, the Court concluded that the ordinance harmed out-of-state interests by "prevent[ing] everyone except the favored local operator from
performing the initial processing step. The ordinance thus deprives outof-state businesses of access to a local market.' 10 6 There was no evidence
10 7
in the record, however, of actual harm to interstate firms.
Under the per se test, Clarkstown had the burden of "demonstrat[ing],
under rigorous scrutiny, that it ha[d] no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.' 0 8 The Court concluded that the ordinance did not
qualify for the necessity exception to the per se rule, because the Town
had alternative, nondiscriminatory methods to advance its legitimate interest in health and safety by enacting "safety regulations" to "ensure
that competitors like Carbone do not underprice the market by cutting
corners on environmental safety."' 1 9 Additionally, the Town's interest in
providing sufficient revenue to amortize the cost of the facility was an
insufficient justification for the ordinance's overt discrimination against
out-of-state interests, because "the town may subsidize the facility
through general taxes or municipal bonds." 110 The Court ignored evidence suggesting that public waste facilities are frequently more environmentally sound than private facilities, which are completely driven by
" ' Also, the Court ignored the
cost considerations.11
reality that local governments adopted flow control ordinances, because taxes are politically
unpopular and bonds are difficult to issue without a guaranteed minimum
112
waste flow.
Furthermore, rejecting the Town's argument that its flow control ordinance helped the environment of foreign jurisdictions by preventing the
Town's garbage from being disposed of at out-of-town landfills, the majority concluded that it was inappropriate for the Town to attempt to extend "[its] police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds. States and
localities may not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to
control commerce in other States. 11 3 The Court's argument that a local
104. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391.
105. Id. at 389; Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 245.
106. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389; Mank, supra note 25, at 32.
107. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 392.
109. Id. at 392-93.
110. Id. at 394; Mank, supra note 25, at 32.
111. Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 595-96.
112. See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
113. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. From a policy perspective, the farther trash is moved,
the greater the risk of spills and contamination. Davies, supra note 34, at 259.
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government or state may not voluntarily consider the interest of other
states is contrary to federalist values.' 14 Why should the federal courts
prevent a state from voluntarily helping other states? Moreover, the
Court did not address the potential liability of municipalities in some cirfor waste, especially if it is contaminated with hazardous
cumstances
15
waste.'
Acknowledging that there is a distinction between laws that favor all
local firms against all out-of-state competitors and the Clarkstown ordinance that favored one firm over all other local or out-of-state competitors, the Court concluded that "this difference just makes the
protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute," because several of the
other local laws that the Court invalidated in the past allowed out-of-state
firms to compete if they built facilities within the local jurisdiction. 116 In
contrast to laws that require local investment, "[tihe flow control ordinance at issue here squelches competition in the waste-processing service
altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside.""11 7 Accordingly, the majority concluded that the fact that a flow control ordinance
harms in-state firms as much as out-of-state interests, except for the chosen firm, does not preclude a court from finding that the ordinance impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce." 8 Because it
concluded that the law was invalid under the per se standard, the Carbone majority did not analyze the ordinance under the Pike balancing
test.'

19

114. Regan, supra note 33, at 1127, 1133 (providing example where "Wisconsin passes a
law forbidding the sale of alcohol in Wisconsin to Illinois residents (but not Wisconsin
residents) under twenty-one" to help Illinois advance its policy of prohibiting drinking by
those under twenty-one as consistent with federalist values).
115. For example, municipalities can be liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)
(West 2006) (stating governments and private parties may recover "response costs" for
cleanup from a responsible person); Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 596 n.119; Eric S. Petersen
& David N. Abramowitz, MunicipalSolid Waste Flow Control in the Post-Carbone World,
22 FORDHAM URB. L. 361, 367-69 (1995) (arguing flow control laws can reduce municipal
liability because
if the waste was delivered to a site not owned by that municipality, the government would have no control over the screening process that had been
implemented and could not assure itself that the site had not been inadvertently accepting hazardous substances, thereby exposing all of its past and
future customers to potential CERCLA liability).
116. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392; but see Klein, supra note 28, at 51-52 (questioning Carbone's finding that the ordinance was discriminatory even though it treated in-state and
out-of-state competitors alike); Verchick, supra note 29, at 1274, 1285 (arguing that the
Carbone Court should have used similar logic as in the Court's racial discrimination and
Equal Protection Clause cases where the Court asks whether the municipality intended to
discriminate before applying strict scrutiny).
117. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 390; Mank, supra note 25, at 32.
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2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, argued that the ordinance
was non-discriminatory, 'because "the garbage sorting monopoly [was]
' 20
achieved at the expense of all competitors, be they local or nonlocal.'
She maintained that the discrimination precedents relied upon by the majority involved significantly different facts. She observed:
In each of the cited cases, the challenged enactment gave a competitive advantage to local business as a group vis-a-vis their out-of-state
or nonlocal competitors as a group. In effect, the regulating jurisdiction ... drew a line around itself and treated
those inside the line
1 21
more favorably than those outside the line.
Furthermore, she contended, "In considering state health and safety regulations such as Local Law 9, we have consistently recognized that the
fact that interests within the regulating jurisdiction are equally affected
by the challenged enactment counsels against a finding of discrimination. ' 122 She argued that the law's evenhanded application was a "significant distinction," because "[tihe existence of substantial in-state interests
harmed by a regulation is 'a powerful safeguard' against legislative
12 3
discrimination."
She concluded, however, that the ordinance was unconstitutional under
the Pike test, because its burdens on interstate commerce exceeded its
benefits. 124 Because courts in DCCD cases should consider the impacts
of the ordinance if other jurisdictions were to adopt similar legislation,
she contended that the potential burdens of the Clarkstown ordinance on
interstate commerce were substantial when its impact was considered
with the impact of similar ordinances in the twenty states that had already
adopted legislation authorizing flow control ordinances and the realistic
possibility that other states would adopt similar legislation. 125 Justice
O'Connor argued that courts applying the Pike balancing test must consider whether the local purpose "can be achieved by other means that
would have a less dramatic impact on the flow of goods."'1 26 She agreed
with the majority that the Town could have used less discriminatory
means to finance the facility "by imposing taxes, by issuing municipal
bonds, or even by lowering its price for processing to a level competitive
with other waste processing facilities."' 27 The Second Circuit in United
Haulers H acknowledged that the ordinance at issue in that case would
likely have failed under Justice O'Connor's application of the Pike test,
but the court argued that her view was neither adopted by the majority
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Carbone, 511 U.S. at 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 405-06.
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nor by the dissenters.' 2 8
Justice O'Connor was the only Justice to address whether Congress in
RCRA had implicitly or explicitly authorized local flow control laws. Although she "agreed with amicus NABL that.., references [in RCRA and
its legislative history] indicate that Congress expected local governments
to implement some form of flow control," she argued that "they neither
individually nor cumulatively rise to the level of the 'explicit' authorization required by our [DCCD] decisions."'12 9 She explained, "First, the
primary focus of the references is on legal impediments imposed as a result of state-not federal-law.' 1 30 Acknowledging that "the House Report seems to contemplate that municipalities may require waste to be
brought to a particular location," she contended that this was not strong
enough evidence to outweigh the DCCD because "this stronger language
is not reflected in the text of the statute.' 3' She concluded that Congress
must enact new legislation that clearly authorizes flow control measures if
it wants to allow such measures. 32 Critics of the Court's DCCD jurisprudence argued that the demand for specific congressional override authori133
zation biases courts in favor of applying the doctrine.
3. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion-PublicFacilitiesAre Different
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, argued that the ordinance was different
from those that the Court had struck down in the past, because it did not
discriminate between local and foreign private firms, and laws favoring
public facilities are different from ones favoring local private firms.13 4
According to Justice Souter, the only significant issue raised by the law
under DCCD was the extent to which the law discriminated geographically. 135 He contended that the DCCD prohibits local governments from
favoring local producers against their foreign competitors, but does not
guarantee, as the majority wrongly claimed, access to any local market.1 3 6
He stated,
In the words of one commentator summarizing our case law, it is
laws 'adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive position
of local economic actors, just because they are local, vis-a-vis their
foreign competitors' that offend the Commerce Clause. . . . The
Commerce
Clause does not otherwise protect access to local
137
markets.
128.

United Haulers II, 438 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 35 (2006).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Carbone, 511 U.S. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 409.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 590-600.
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417 (quoting Regan, supra note 33, at 1138).
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The law clearly did not discriminate between local and out-of-state private firms in general, but there remained the issue of whether the Town
138
could favor one operator.
Justice Souter contended the Court should treat laws that give public
facilities a favored or monopoly position to achieve public safety and welfare goals differently from ordinances that discriminate in favor of local
private firms, even if part of the rationale for the ordinance is to finance a
public facility. 139 He argued that the favored facility was basically public
in nature, stating, "Clarkstown's transfer station is essentially a municipal
facility ... and soon to revert entirely to municipal ownership .... [It]
performs a municipal function that tradition as well as state and federal
law recognize as the domain of local government.' 140 While special protections for private enterprises are usually based on economic favoritism
toward local interests, he contended that flow control ordinances that
promote public facilities are frequently grounded in public health or welfare concerns. He stated, "The local government itself occupies a very
different market position, however, being the one entity that enters the
market to serve the public interest of local citizens quite apart from private interest in private gain. '1 41 Furthermore, in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court "recognize[d] that the States
occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system and
that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must
42
reflect that position.'
Justice Souter argued that the Court should apply the more lenient and
nuanced Pike standard in determining whether laws favoring public facilities violate the DCCD, because there are usually good public welfare reasons for local laws favoring the use of public facilities, and there is no
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state private capital. 143 Because laws favoring public facilities do not discriminate between local and
out-of-state private firms, he argued that they should not be subject to the
per se discrimination test. 44 He stated:
Because the favor does not go to local private competitors of out-ofstate firms, out-of-state governments will at the least lack a motive to
favor their own firms in order to equalize the positions of private
competitors. While a preference in favor of the government may incidentally function as local favoritism as well, a more particularized
inquiry is necessary before a court can say whether such a law does
in fact smack too strongly of economic protectionism. 4 5
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 416.
Id. at 412-14, 428-29.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420-21.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 418-24 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 422.
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Agreeing with Justice O'Connor, he contended that the Court should apply the Pike balancing test to Local Law 9 rather than the per se test used
146
by the majority.
Unlike Justice O'Connor, however, the dissenters concluded that the
local law did not violate the Pike test. 147 The dissenters acknowledged
that the Clarkstown transfer station was more expensive than Carbone's
facility, but that fact alone did not make the local law violate the DCCD,
which bars only discrimination against out-of-state interests and does not
require the most economically efficient solution. 148 Similarly, the fact
that the facility is a monopoly does not automatically make it violate the
Clause, even if monopolies are often illegal under statutory law. 14 9
Moreover, Justice Souter argued that the majority opinion failed to address the fact that the Court, in antitrust cases, has frequently allowed
local governments to establish exclusive franchises, which are effectively
local monopolies, in a number of areas, including public utilities, cable
television operators, sports promoters, ambulance and taxicab services,
and, most notably, trash collectors and processors, even though such
franchises clearly have at least incidental impacts on interstate
commerce. 150

Justice Souter argued that the flow control ordinance was constitutional under the Clause because most of the economic costs were borne
by local residents rather than out-of-state interests. 15 ' There was no evidence that an out-of-state facility wanted to or could handle the Town's
waste and thus there was no evidence of any burden on interstate commerce. 152 Justice Souter maintained that the Court has invalidated local
laws in prior cases only when they increased the cost of local goods to
out-of-state markets. 153 Additionally, unlike the majority or Justice
O'Connor, the dissenters argued that because the burdens of the ordinance fell mainly on local residents, "protection of the public fisc is a
legitimate local benefit directly advanced by the ordinance.' 54 Furthermore, the dissenters suggested that the ordinance was more equitable for
taxpayers. They stated:
The ordinance does, of course, protect taxpayers, including those
who already support the transfer station by patronizing it, from ending up with the tab for making provision for large-volume trash producers like Carbone, who would rely on the municipal facility when
that was advantageous but opt out whenever the transfer station's
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
where

Id. at 422-24.
Id. at 422-23, 430.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 424-25.
See id. at 424 n.13 (observing that challenges to flow control ordinances have failed
"defendants have availed themselves of the state action exception to the antitrust

laws").

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

425-28.
427-28.
425.
429.
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price rose above the market price. 155
Additionally, Justice Souter contended that the flow control law had a
benefit beyond financing. He stated, "In proportioning each resident's
burden to the amount of trash generated, the ordinance has the added
virtue of providing a direct and measurable deterrent to the generation of
unnecessary waste in the first place."'1 56 Since the Town's residents bore
the additional costs of running a public landfill and little harm accrued to
out-of-state interests, the dissenters
contended that the ordinance was
15 7
constitutional under the Pike test.
4. A Critique of Carbone
The Carbone decision should not have applied a strict per se discrimination analysis when there was no evidence of discrimination or actual
harm to out-of-state firms. 158 The ordinance treated waste the same
whether it was locally generated or not, whether the hauler was local or
15 9
not, and regardless of where the waste would ultimately be disposed.
There was simply no geographic origin discrimination in the case and no
evidence that Clarkstown was trying to favor local private firms at the
expense of foreign firms.' 60 The majority contended that the law was discriminatory in effect, because "[t]he flow control ordinance has the same
design and effect" as local processing laws requiring local inspection or
production of goods that effectively barred out-of-state goods. 16 1 Justice
Souter effectively rebutted the majority's discrimination argument by
demonstrating that the precedent cited by the majority opinion involved
different factual circumstances where there was evidence that the invalidated law was intended to discriminate against out-of-state private firms
and to favor local private firms. 16 2 The Carbone majority could not show
any evidence that foreign private firms were economically disadvantaged
compared to in-state firms. 163 The Carbone majority erred in applying
the traditional economic-discrimination model, applicable to cases of local governments favoring local firms over out-of-state firms, to the quite
different problem of flow control ordinances that simply seek to finance
public waste facilities for the public good.
Justice O'Connor's concern that the national waste market would be
harmed if many jurisdictions adopted similar legislation is a legitimate
point to raise, 164 but flow control ordinances that do not discriminate between local private firms and foreign firms are likely to have net societal
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 425-30.
O'Grady, supra note 32, at 604.
Id. at 603; Larsen, supra note 61, at 856.
Heinzerling, supra note 32, at 230; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 604.
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 604.
Carbone,511 U.S. at 426 (Souter, J., dissenting); O'Grady, supra note 32, at 604.
O'Grady, supra note 32, at 605-06.
Carbone, 511 U.S at 406-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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benefits and will not harm foreign interests. Because local residents bear
most of the costs of flow control ordinances, there is little harm to foreign
jurisdictions. 16 5 Furthermore, there may be a net benefit to foreign jurisdictions, because of a reduction in harmful waste. 166 The majority
wrongly refused to consider the ordinance's benefits to the national environment. 167 In a federalist system, a state or local government should be
able to consider the positive benefits, as well as the detrimental effects, of
1 68
a law to other jurisdictions.
Both the majority and Justice O'Connor underestimated the positive
benefits of flow control ordinances. The primary motivation that local
governments have in enacting flow control ordinances is to promote the
public health and address environmental concerns by providing sufficient
waste facilities to meet local needs. 169 Clarkstown and several amici argued "that as landfill space diminishes and environmental cleanup costs
escalate, measures like flow control become necessary to ensure the safe
handling and proper treatment of solid waste.' 170 In a consent decree,
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation required that Clarkstown build the facility to replace an old, environmentally unsuitable landfill after citing the Town for dumping in violation of
environmental laws. 171 Accordingly, although Clarkstown was concerned
with how it would pay for the facility, the Town's main motive was serving public needs rather than harming out-of-state competition.
Furthermore, Justice Souter and many commentators have criticized
Carbone for going beyond the prevention of discrimination against outof-state competitors, a core value of the DCCD, to a promotion of freemarket competition comparable to the Court's infamous 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a law limiting working hours because the Court found that the Due Process Clause implicitly constitutionalized a free-market philosophy. 172 The Carbone Court's holding is
based on the free-market rationale that the law violates the DCCD because it "deprive[s] competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to
165. Id. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 392-93.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 114-15 and infra note 409 and accompanying text.
169. Gabrysch, supra note 79, at 587-91.
170. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392-93.
171. Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 424-25 ("No more than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause
'does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics... [or] embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism.., or of laissez faire."' (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 230-31, 26870 (comparing Carbone to Lochner in an effort to promote markets); McCauliff, supra
note 59, at 661-64, 673-85 (criticizing Carbone'smarket-based discrimination test); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 149, 153 (1994) (same)
[hereinafter Supreme Court, 1993 Term]; see generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (invalidating a work hour limit because the legislation violated freedom of contract
implicit in the Due Process Clause); McGreal, supra note 15, at 1230-37 (arguing Supreme
Court's DCCD cases are similar to free market approach in Lochner).
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a local market. '173 Under the Carbone Court's rationale, any time a state
assumes monopoly control of any activity, including core state activities
such as operating prisons or providing law enforcement, that theoretically
could be provided by private markets, then the law is potentially unconstitutional under the DCCD, but such a broad reading of the DCCD
would potentially swallow state sovereignty, federalism, and the Tenth
Amendment. 174 The Carbone majority invalidated the flow control ordinance because it interfered with free access to waste markets, although
there was no evidence of discrimination between in-state and out-of-state
firms. 175 There is no historical evidence that the framers of the Constitution intended to bar non-discriminatory state laws that in some way hinder the free market and incidentally affect out-of-state interests. 176 While
the framers intended to prevent destructive commercial protectionism,
Professor Eule argues, "There was no intent, however, to inject a philoso'177
phy of laissez-faire into the constitutional fabric.
A possible criticism of Justice Souter's argument that public waste monopolies are different from laws favoring local private firms is that both
public and private waste monopolies should be subject to the same level
of scrutiny. 178 Even if public and private facilities are subject to the same
standard, the Clarkstown ordinance was not a classic protectionist law
seeking to promote a local economy at the expense of the national economy, but, as Justice Souter observed in his dissenting opinion, it imposed
any additional costs primarily on the local population.' 79 Both because
the ordinance was even-handed against local and out-of-state businesses
and imposed most of its costs on local residents rather than out-of-state
residents, the Carbone Court should have applied the Pike standard,
which is sufficient to invalidate local laws that seriously harm out-of-state
interests. 18 0

173. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
175. Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 269-70.
176. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 31, at 78-80; Eule, supra note 31, at 429-35; Regan, supra note 33, at 1179; Verchick, supra note 29, at 1281-83.
177. Eule, supra note 31, at 435.
178. Supreme Court, 1993 Term, supra note 172, at 159.
179. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 426-30 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Rachel D. Baker, C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown:A Wake-Up Call for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 67, 83-86 (1995).
180. Baker, supra note 179, at 83-86; Verchick, supra note 29, at 1305-09.
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III.

A.

ARE PUBLIC FACILITIES DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE
FACILITIES?: THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT AND SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED HAULERS ASSOCIATION INC. V. ONEIDA-HERKIMER
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

1. Background
In United Haulers I and United Haulers II, the Second Circuit applied a
deferential approach to flow control ordinances that favor public waste
facilities but that do not discriminate between local private firms and foreign firms. 8 1 In the two United Haulers decisions, the defendants,
Oneida and Herkimer counties, both in New York State, (collectively,
"the Counties") enacted flow control regulations in 1990 that required all
solid wastes and recyclables generated within the Counties to be delivered to one of several waste processing facilities owned by the defendant
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority ("the Authority"),
a municipal corporation. 182 The Authority charged a per-ton "tipping"
fee for receiving this waste that was significantly higher than the fees
charged on the open market elsewhere in New York State. 183 In 1995,
the plaintiffs, United Haulers Association, Inc., a New York waste company, and several other New York waste firms filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York arguing that the
ordinances violated the DCCD. 184 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
barring the enforcement of these ordinances, along with damages and attorneys' fees.1 8 5 The plaintiffs conceded that in-state firms did not have
any unfair advantage in the bidding process for operating the defendants'
facilities. 86 They argued, however, that the ordinances were biased
against out-of-state interests because the Authority's most recent contract
required shipment of the Counties' waste to a landfill in New York State,
and that the Authority was then constructing a New York landfill site to
which all of the Counties' landfill-bound processed wastes would be delivered beginning in 2007.187 The plaintiffs contended that both of those
18 8
developments burdened interstate commerce.
In 2000, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 189 The district court found that the Counties' flow control ordinances were comparable to the law invalidated in Carbone and caused
181. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d 150, 157-60 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 35

(2006); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245,
255-65 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter United Haulers I].
182.

United Haulers II, 438 F.3d at 154.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 153.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 154.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 154-55.
189. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., No. 95-CV516, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22331, at *21 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2000).
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per se discrimination in favor of a single, favored provider. 190 The district
court rejected the defendants' argument that that their actions were not
discriminatory because they were public entities and concluded that the
Counties acted the same as a private business that could force all haulers
to sell to it and thereby hoard waste. 191 The district court enjoined the
flow control ordinances. 192 The district court also referred the action to
the magistrate judge to calculate damages, pending the defendants'
193
appeal.
2.

United Haulers I

In 2001, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
held that the ordinance did not cause per se discrimination under the
Commerce Clause, because "they [did] not favor local business interests
and therefore are not discriminatory.' 1 94 United Haulers I initially concluded that the Counties were acting as market regulators in "the market
for waste collection and disposal," because they used coercive regulatory
methods including fines, permit revocation, and imprisonment. 195 Rejecting the district court's assumption that flow control regulations are
always subject to the rigorous per se review standard, the Second Circuit
concluded that a court must analyze the specific facts concerning a particular flow control ordinance to determine whether it is a discriminatory
law that falls within the per se test or whether it only has incidental burdens on commerce causing it to be analyzed under the Pike balancing
test. 196 It concluded that the ordinances were non-discriminatory and
should be reviewed under the Pike test; if further held that the district
court erred in applying the per se standard and remanded the case to the
district judge could gather
district court to permit discovery so that the
97
the facts necessary to apply the Pike test.'
The Second Circuit concluded that "the district court erred in its Commerce Clause analysis by failing to recognize the distinction between private and public ownership of the favored facility" and that "[in doing so,
the district court also effectively foreclosed the Counties' ability to show
that they had no reasonable alternatives to implementing flow control
laws" under the Pike balancing test. 19 8 The United Haulers I court determined that there was a "determinative" difference between the public
facilities at issue in its case and the transfer station owned by a 'local
private contractor"' in Carbone.199 The Second Circuit maintained that
the Carbone decision was concerned about preventing local or state gov190. Id. at *12-18.
191. Id. at *16-18.

192. Id. at *18.
193. Id. at *23.

194. United Haulers I, 261 F.3d 245, 263 (2d Cir. 2001).

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

255.
255-57.
256-57, 264.
257.

199. Id. at 258.
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ernments from favoring in-state private businesses, but that the decision
did not prohibit laws requiring that all waste be handled by local public
facilities. 200
The plaintiffs argued that the Carbone decision had not distinguished
between private and public facilities, but the Second Circuit concluded
that "the Carbone majority referenced the private character of the favored facility several times."' 20 1 United Haulers I stated:
The [Carbone]Court repeatedly referenced the private nature of the
favored facility and repeatedly alluded to the dangers of allowing
local government to favor local industry or a single local business
over out-of-state competition. For example, the Court held that "the
town may not employ discriminatory regulation to give [the designated 202
facility] an advantage over rival businesses from out of
State."
Similarly, the Carbone Court stated that "state and local governments
may not use their regulatory power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities. ' 20 3 The Second Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court in Carbone had implicitly
recognized a distinction between public and private facilities but that the
Carbone "Justices were divided over the fact of whether the favored facil'2 0 4
ity was public or private, rather than on the import of that distinction.
According to the Second Circuit's reading of the case, the Carbone majority treated the facility as a private one for which the Town had impermissibly discriminated in its favor over out-of-state businesses. 20 5 By
contrast, according to the Second Circuit, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion and Justice6 Souter's dissenting opinion in Carbone treated the
20
facility as public.
Although it acknowledged that the Carbone majority opinion had
never explicitly adopted the public-private distinction and that "its language can fairly be described as elusive on that point," the Second Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court, in a series of prior cases in which
local laws favoring "local processing" of various commodities were challenged under the DCCD, had "evidence[d] the same intent to prevent
state or local governments from favoring in-state business or investment
at the expense of out-of-state businesses. ' 20 7 For example, in Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, the Court invalidated as discriminatory a City of
Madison, Wisconsin ordinance requiring all milk sold in the city to be
pasteurized within five miles of the central portion of the city because the
200. Id. at 258-59.
201. Id. at 259-60.
202. Id. at 258 (quoting C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394
(1994) (emphasis added by Second Circuit)).
203. Id. at 258-59 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added by Second
Circuit)).
204. Id. at 259.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 260.
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"practical effect" of the ordinance was to "erect an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the
State. '20 8 Although out-of-state businesses could build pasteurizing facilities within the five-mile radius, the Court found that the ordinance was
discriminatory, because it forced out-of-state firms to invest in or near
Madison. 20 9 The Second Circuit interpreted Dean and similar cases as
being concerned about local governments favoring local private firms. 2 10
The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the DCCD
prohibited local governments from "hoarding" local resources, including
waste products and services, and argued that the Clause only prohibited
local laws allowing local private businesses to hoard resources, stating
"that a local law discriminates against interstate commerce when it
hoards local resources in a manner that favors local business, industry or
investment over out-of-state competition. '2 1 1 United Haulers I quoted
the following language from the majority in Carbone, "Put another way,
the offending local laws hoard a local resource-be it meat, shrimp....
milk [or garbage]-for the benefit of local businesses that treat it."' 2 1 2 The
Second Circuit also argued that public-favored facilities were less likely
to be protectionist and were "less likely to give rise to retaliation and
jealousy from neighboring states" than private-favored facilities. 21 3 It
stated:
Moreover, ordinances that favor a public facility to the detriment of
all private actors are equipped with a built-in check: municipal legislators are accountable to citizens, many of whose interests are likely
to be aligned to some degree with the interests
of private business,
21 4
either as owners, employees or investors.
Furthermore, the primary burden of the defendant Counties' public
waste facilities fell on local residents rather than out-of-state interests.2 15
Because "a flow control ordinance governing the processing of waste is
not discriminatory under the Commerce Clause unless it favors local private business interests over out-of-state interests," the Second Circuit
concluded that "[f]low control regulations like the Oneida-Herkimer ordinances, which negatively impact all private businesses alike, regardless
of whether in-state or out-of-state, in favor of a publicly owned facility,
are not discriminatory under the DCCD. '2 16 The Second Circuit held
that the district court erred in applying the per se standard. 21 7
208. Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
209. Id.; United Haulers 1, 261 F.3d at 260.
210. United Haulers 1, 261 F.3d at 260-61.
211. Id. at 261.
212. Id. (quoting C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (emphasis added by Second Circuit)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 261-62.
216. Id. at 263.
217. Id.
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In an opinion concurring in the result and the majority opinion, Judge
Calabresi stated, "Waste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local
government function. With respect to such functions, the opinion's analysis of the significance of public ownership under Carbone seems to me
quite right. Whether the same analysis would apply
to activities that are
'2 18
not traditionally governmental is not before us."
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide
whether the requirement imposed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce under the Pike test. 219 The Second Circuit strongly suggested that
it thought the defendant Counties would win under the Pike standard,
stating that "'[t]he local interests that are served by consolidating garbage service in the hands of the town-safety, sanitation, reliable garbage
service, cheaper service to residents-would in any event outweigh any
arguable burdens placed on interstate commerce." 220 The Second Circuit, however, did not reach the merits of the case under Pike, stating,
"We will follow our own advice, however, and resist the temptation to
rule as a matter of law prior to adequate discovery and further argument
by the parties, which will undoubtedly assist the district court in this factintensive determination."'2 2' The court held that the district court must
consider a facility's public ownership when it applied the Pike test,
stating:
We do hold . . . that although it does not, in and of itself, give a
municipality free reign to place burdens on the free flow of commerce between the states, the fact that a municipality is acting within
its traditional purview must factor into the district court's determination of whether the local interests are
substantially outweighed by
22 2
the burdens on interstate commerce.
The plaintiffs sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to review United
Haulers I, but the Court declined to hear the case, perhaps because it was
22 3
not yet a final decision pending the remand to the district court.
Although it did not establish a categorical rule for public facilities,
United Haulers I suggested that the Second Circuit preferred applying the
more deferential Pike test to public waste facilities as long as they "negatively impact all private businesses alike, regardless of whether in-state or
out-of-state. 2 24 Its strongest argument was that in almost all cases in
which the Court invalidated a local law as violating the DCCD, the law
favored local private firms over out-of-state private firms; therefore, an
ordinance that treats both types of businesses the same is quite different
218. Id. at 264 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, N.Y., 66 F.3d 1272, 1295 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 534 U.S.
1082 (2002).
224. United Haulers I, 261 F.3d at 263.
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and deserves a more deferential type of review?2z5 United Haulers I's
weakest argument was that the Court's decisions were only concerned
with local private firms "hoarding" natural resources, including waste and
waste services, but that
a local government "hoard" those same resources
226
is never a concern.
3.

United Haulers II: The 2006 Second Circuit Decision

In 2005, in an unreported decision, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, upholding the flow control requirements under the Pike test, because "'the challenged laws do not
treat similarly situated in-state and out-of-state business interests differently,"' and therefore the ordinances "do not impose any cognizable burden on interstate commerce. '22 7 In 2006, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. 228 On appeal, the plaintiffs acknowledged that
"the ordinances afford equal treatment to all commercial entities without
regard to their location," but the plaintiffs argued that the district court
erred in failing to consider whether the ordinances burden interstate
commerce by "prevent[ing] goods and services from flowing across inter'229
nal political boundaries.
The Second Circuit has interpreted the Pike balancing test to require a
challenger to prove that a challenged local law "'impose[s] a burden on
interstate commerce that is qualitatively or quantitatively different from
that imposed on intrastate commerce."' 230 Applying its different burden
test, the Second Circuit concluded that the defendants' ordinances clearly
do not treat in-state private firms differently from out-of-state firms. 231
To the extent that it happened to choose an in-state firm to operate its
facilities in its most recent contract, the court found that the Authority
was simply acting as a market participant that can choose its contractual
partners like any private business and was not acting as a market regula232
tor giving legal favor to in-state businesses.
The plaintiffs argued, however, that the Second Circuit's different burden test did not address the problem of a public monopoly that hoarded
resources within one state. 233 Because the "central purpose" of the Com225. Id. at 260-61 (discussing several Supreme Court cases where local law favored local
private businesses over out-of-state private businesses).
226. Id. at 261.
227. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting unreported district
court decision), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 35 (2006).
228. Id. at 153.
229. Id. at 155-56.
230. Id. at 156-57 (quoting Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.
2001)); accord Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
389 F.3d 491,500-02 (5th Cir. 2004); but see U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus, 205 F.3d
1063, 1065-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Pike to reject a law that imposed restrictions only
on in-state competition).
231. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d at 156-57.
232. Id. at 157-60.
233. Id.
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merce Clause is to establish national markets free from state barriers, the
Second Circuit acknowledged that
there may be some force to plaintiffs' claim that the narrow class of
regulations that explicitly create a prohibitory barrier to commerce
for the benefit of a governmental entity operating in an area of traditional governmental concern, even if non-discriminatory, impose
some differential burden on interstate
commerce which should be
2 34
examined under the Pike test.
Perhaps because two of the three judges on the panel were different,
United Haulers II was more forthright in acknowledging the hoarding issue than United Haulers 1.235 United Haulers H, however, stated that any
burden imposed by the ordinances "is blunted considerably by the absence of any suggestion that these ordinances have any practical effect
other than to raise the costs of performing waste collection services
within the Counties, and thus the prices paid by local consumers of those
services.

' 236

The Second Circuit concluded that the burden on interstate commerce
as measured by the Pike test was low, because the burdens of the ordi237
nances fall mostly on local residents rather than out-of-state interests.
The court observed that, in its prior USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of BabyIon 238 decision, it had upheld a town's free provision of waste hauling and
disposal services even though that system effectively eliminated all private competition and "impose[d] a public monopoly encompassing the
activities of waste collection, processing and disposal." 2 39 In light of that
holding, the court concluded that the partial monopoly established by the
defendants' ordinances imposed only a "limited burden" on interstate
commerce. 240 The Second Circuit failed to consider, however, that the
Court has distinguished between a local government acting as a market
regulator and one acting as a market participant so that the means used
by a government to achieve a monopoly are relevant. 24 1 Even if a city
may use free services financed by taxes to establish a de facto monopoly,
it does not follow that a city acting as a market regulator may establish a
limited monopoly.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit in Daviess County, the Second Circuit did not
consider the burden that the ordinances imposed on the movement of
waste to other states as being impermissible. 2 42 The Second Circuit acknowledged that "the interstate market for waste disposal services would
234. Id. at 160-62.
235. Only Judge Calabresi sat in both United Haulers decisions. In United Haulers II,
Judges Katzman and Wesley sat instead of Judges Meskill and Leval.
236. United Haulers H, 438 F.3d at 160-62.

237. Id.
238. 66 F.3d 1272, 1293-94 (2d Cir. 1995).
239. United Haulers H, 438 F.3d at 161 (citing USA Recycling, Inc., 66 F.3d at 1293-94).
240. Id.

241. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1984); supra notes
39-41 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
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suffer if numerous jurisdictions were to impose restrictions like these on
private entities that engage in trash collection. '243 The United Haulers H
court, however, argued that the Supreme Court since 1905 had "allowed
municipalities to exercise the greater power of taking exclusive control of
all locally generated solid waste from the moment that it is placed on the
2 45
curb." '244 In California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works
and Gardner v. Michigan,246 the Court in 1905 rejected takings and due
process challenges where San Francisco and Detroit had each granted exclusive rights to collect and dispose of garbage within the city to a single
scavenger company, which had the right to incinerate the garbage. 247 The
Second Circuit in USA Recycling acknowledged that those two decisions
had not addressed a Commerce Clause challenge but declined to read
Carbone so broadly as to require the effective overruling of these two
Court decisions. 248 Because the Supreme Court and Second Circuit in
prior cases had allowed local governments to monopolize waste services,
the United Haulers II court concluded that any burden from the ordi249
nances on commerce was permissible and not protectionist.
The United Haulers II court interpreted the Commerce Clause as primarily concerned with two purposes. The first purpose is "safeguard[ing]
the ability of commercial goods to cross state lines primarily as a means
to protect the right of businesses to compete on an equal footing wherever they choose to operate. '2 50 The Second Circuit presented the Commerce Clause's second purpose as enabling "states and municipalities to
exercise their police powers without undue interference from the laws of
neighboring jurisdictions. '25 1 The court concluded, "[w]here neither of
these underlying purposes is implicated by a particular legislative enactment, the burden imposed on interstate commerce must be regarded as
insubstantial. "252
The Second Circuit determined that the burden imposed by the ordinances is "slight," and thus concluded that "the defendants need to present only a minimal showing of local benefit in order to compel a finding
that this burden is not 'clearly excessive' to the benefits that the ordinances provide. ' 253 The Second Circuit found that the ordinances provided several benefits that outweighed the slight burden imposed by the
ordinance. 2 54 First, although the court acknowledged that the Carbone
decision stated that financial stability alone may not justify a local law
243. United Haulers H, 438 F.3d at 161.
244. Id. (citing Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) and Cal. Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905)).
245. 199 U.S. at 318-24.
246. 199 U.S. at 332-33.
247. USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1995).
248. Id. at 1294.
249. United Haulers H, 438 F.3d at 161.
250. Id. (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
251. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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discriminating against interstate commerce, the United Haulers II court
concluded that courts may consider 2the
financial advantages of non-dis55
criminatory flow control ordinances.
Additionally, the Second Circuit determined that the ordinances provided several additional benefits beyond assuring financial security. Several local governments in amici briefs had argued that publicly-owned
waste facilities promote "the interest of public health and environmental
protection. 2 56 The court found that "the flow control measures substantially facilitate the Counties' goal of establishing a comprehensive waste
management system that encourages waste volume reduction, recycling,
and reuse and ensures the proper disposal of hazardous wastes, thereby
'257
reducing the Counties' exposure to costly environmental tort suits.
According to the court, the flow control ordinances' requirement that all
waste in the Counties go to the Authority's sites advances these goals by
"establishing differential pricing for different categories of waste, assessing fines for non-compliance, and directing the region's trash to landfill
facilities that employ acceptable environmental practices. ' 258 Although
it acknowledged that the plaintiffs might be correct that alternative methods might secure the Authority's financial health, the court concluded
that only the flow control ordinances "could address [the Counties'] liability concerns or encourage recycling across the wide range of waste
products accepted by the Authority's recycling program. ' 259 Because of
all these benefits, the Second Circuit concluded that under the Pike test
the public benefits of the ordinances outweigh any burden, stating, "We
conclude that even if we were to recognize that the ordinances burden
interstate commerce, we would find that the burden imposed is not
clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. '2 60 Because the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the ordinances were unconstitutional
and had failed to do so, the court determined that the ordinances "do not
violate the DCCD, and therefore [the court] do[es] not decide whether
'26 1
the ordinances burden interstate commerce at all."
B.

NATIONAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION V. DAVIESS
COUNTY, KENTUCKY

The Second Circuit's two United Haulers decisions directly conflict with
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Daviess County.262 In 2004, the defendant
Daviess County, Kentucky enacted a flow control ordinance requiring all
municipal solid waste collection services in the county to dispose of the
255. Id. at 161-62.
256. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 17, at 7-9; supra note 170 and accompanying text.
257. United Haulers II, 438 F.3d at 162.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 162-63.
260. Id. at 150.
261. Id. at 163.
262. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 909-11 (6th Cir.),
reh'g en banc denied, 446 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 2006 WL 2619953
(June 28, 2006) (No. 06-359).
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waste they collected at the Daviess County Landfill or Transfer Station.263 This Ordinance was comparable to the ordinances at issue in
United Haulers. The plaintiff, a trade association representing several
waste collection, transportation, and disposal firms in the county, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, arguing that the Ordinance violated the DCCD by prohibiting
firms from exporting waste to out-of-state sites, including ones owned by
some of its members. 264 In 2004, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment, issued a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendant from
26 5
enforcing the terms of the Ordinance.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 266 The Sixth
Circuit found that the Ordinance facially discriminated against out-ofstate interests by prohibiting the plaintiff's members from using other instate and out-of-state facilities.2 67 Although it concurred with the defendant in that the Ordinance did not discriminate against out-of-state waste
collectors, who, like in-state collectors, may haul waste to the court's facilities, the court concluded that the Ordinance "discriminates against
out-of-state waste disposal facilities. '268 Rejecting the defendant's argument that its waste disposal facilities were different from the waste transfer station at issue in Carbone because the waste was no longer in
commerce once it is disposed of, the Sixth Circuit determined that the
Ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by preventing out-of-state
firms from providing the service of disposing of the waste, which is often
269
of more commercial value than the waste itself.
The Sixth Circuit specifically refused to adopt United Haulers I's "public-private ownership" distinction. 2 70 The Sixth Circuit only addressed
United Haulers I, but the Sixth Circuit's reasoning applies equally to the
subsequent United Haulers II, which was decided twenty-three days later.
Because its prior precedents found "DCCD violations in cases where the
facility was publicly owned," the Sixth Circuit stated that its rules of precedent precluded it from adopting the Second Circuit's private-public
27 1
distinction.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit "respectfully disagree[d] with the Second Circuit on the proposition that Carbone lends support for the publicprivate distinction drawn by that court. ' 272 The Sixth Circuit argued that
the primary concern in Carbone was that the challenged ordinance "'de263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 909-10.
Id. at 910.
Id.
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prives out-of-state businesses of access to a local market"' and not that the
local beneficiary was a private or public firm.2 73 The Daviess County
court argued that the focus of the Carbone court's DCCD analysis "was
on the economic harm to out-of-state actors and the local market" resulting from the ordinance's "'bar[ring] the import of the processing service.'"274 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the crux of the
inquiry is whether the local ordinance burdens interstate commerce, not
'27 5
whether the local entity benefited by the ordinance is publicly owned.
Even United Haulers I had quoted the seminal language in the Supreme
Court's 1949 decision in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond that the purpose
of the Commerce Clause "is that every farmer and craftsmen shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation. '2 76 The Sixth Circuit maintained that the
"free access" principle required courts to focus on a law's impact on outof-state markets rather than whether the local beneficiary of a challenged
2 77
law happened to be a private or public entity.
The Daviess County court argued that the Second Circuit had mistakenly assumed that the Carbone Court's references to "'rival businesses"'
and "'local enterprise"' must refer to private businesses, but the Sixth
Circuit contended that
[a] municipality can be considered a local business in competition
with out-of-state businesses, and a municipality can participate in local enterprise. While the Supreme Court expressed concerns about
aiding local enterprise at the expense of rival businesses, these concerns remain regardless
of whether the municipality owns the fa278
vored business.
According to the Daviess County court, the Carbone Court's central concern was that the ordinance in that case "squelch[ed] competition altogether, leaving no room for outside investment" and not whether the
favored firm was public or private. 279 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the
majority opinion in Carbone never accepted the public-private decision
urged by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion or Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. 280 Justice Souter's dissenting opinion explicitly stated,
"the majority ignores this distinction between public and private
'28 1
enterprise.
273. Id. at 910-11 (quoting C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (emphasis supplied by Sixth Circuit)).
274. Id. at 911 (quoting Carbone,511 U.S. at 392).
275. Id.
276. Id.; United Haulers I, 261 F.3d 245, 254 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons
v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
277. Daviess County, 434 F.3d at 910-11.
278. Id. at 911.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 911-12.
281. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 420 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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The Daviess County court determined that the majority opinion in Carbone treated the waste transfer facility as owned in fact by the municipality, because the Town would acquire the facility for one dollar after the
private firm operated it for five years. 28 2 The Carbone Court stated,
"'The object of this arrangement was to amortize the cost of the transfer
station: The town would finance its new facility with the income generated by the tipping fees."' 283 Furthermore, the Carbone Court made several other references to the facility's public ownership when it
characterized it as a "town-sponsored facility" and as "[the Town's] project. '' 284 The Sixth Circuit concluded, "The [Carbone] majority did not
find that the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce because the waste transfer facility was privately owned, and we find that the
'285
Supreme Court implicitly rejected the public-private distinction.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the United Haulers I court's statement
that "'[t]he common thread in the Court's [DCCD] jurisprudence ...

is

that a local law discriminates against interstate commerce when it hoards
local resources in a manner that favors local business, industry or investment over out-of-state competition.'"286 But the Daviess County court
found that Daviess County was "acting as a local business in the local
industry of waste disposal. ' 287 Rejecting United Haulers I private-public
distinction, the Sixth Circuit determined that Daviess County's ordinance
placed it "in a dual role: as a local business selling waste disposal services,
and as a local government hoarding 'waste, and the demand to get rid of
it, for the benefit' of this business. '288 The Daviess County court concluded that "[t]he fact that Defendant acts as both a business and a government, as opposed to just a government, does not cloak its facially
protectionist activity from the appropriate scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause. 2 89 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Ordinance violated the DCCD and its permanent injunction against the Ordinance.
C.

ANALYSIS OF UNITED HAULERS AND DAVIESS CoUNTY

The Daviess County decision made a strong argument that the Carbone
majority opinion would not apply a different standard to public facilities
and that the Carbone majority would likely have invalidated the Daviess
County flow control ordinance. 290 Carbone, however, applied the per se
test too broadly. Although lower courts may not overrule Carbone,there
are good reasons to read that case as narrowly as possible, because the
282. Daviess County, 434 F.3d at 912.
283. Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387 (emphasis supplied by Sixth Circuit)).
284. Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393-94).
285. Id.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. (quoting United Haulers I, 261 F.3d 245, 261 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).
Id.
See supra notes 270-81, 288 and accompanying text.
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per se approach fails to consider whether a local law has minimal effects
on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court at times has recognized that
the per se test should apply only to cases where a law discriminates between in-state and out-of-state competitors.2 91 In General Motors Corp.
v. Tracy, the Court stated that "the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective [is] preserving a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents
'292
or resident competitors.
Even if public waste monopolies should be subject to the same standard as private firms, 293 the Second Circuit, in United Haulers I and II,
effectively demonstrated that flow control laws that do not discriminate
between local firms and foreign firms should be analyzed under the Pike
test, because they are evenhanded. 2 94 Because the flow control ordinances at issue did not confer preferential advantages on local competitors, courts should not apply the per se discrimination test to laws
favoring public facilities. In applying the Pike test, the United Haulers II
decision made a convincing argument that the ordinances placed only a
minimal burden on interstate commerce, that they provided several important benefits, and that no alternative could achieve all of those benefits. 295 If a law primarily burdens local residents, there is no actual
evidence of harm to foreign firms, and there are significant public benefits from the law for which there are no alternatives, courts should follow
United Haulers H and hold that such a law is constitutional under the
296
DCCD.

IV. A MODIFIED THREE PART TEST FOR
PUBLIC FACILITIES
A.

NARROWING THE PER SE TEST

The per se test used by the Court since its 1978 decision in City of
Philadelphiais too inflexible in rejecting any local law that theoretically
discriminates against out-of-state commerce. 297 According to Professor
O'Grady:
[A] "discriminatory" state statute would theoretically include any
statute that benefits, even slightly, economic players within a state to
the detriment of their out-of-state competitors. It is irrelevant to the
question of discrimination whether the statute was designed to effect
a legitimate, non-protectionist purpose, and it is irrelevant if the de291. McGreal, supra note 15, at 1217-22; supra notes 5, 44-45, 53 and accompanying
text.
292. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
broad);

Supreme Court, 1993 Term, supra note 172, at 159.
See supra notes 197-200, 230-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-61 and accompanying text.
O'Grady, supra note 32, at 627-29 (arguing that a per se discrimination test is too
Verchick, supra note 29, at 1249 (same).
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gree of discrimination is minimal. 298
In Carbone, the challenger was a local business and there was no evidence of harm to out-of-state interests, but the majority presumed that
the ordinance was discriminatory and did not consider the law's actual
burden on interstate commerce. 2 99 The Court's overly broad per se discrimination test contributes to the incoherence of its DCCD, because the
Court inevitably selectively applies a test that in theory could invalidate a
wide range of state and local laws.30 0 The Court occasionally has recognized that the per se test should apply only to cases where a law discriminates between in-state and out-of-state competitors. 3 1 The Court should
reformulate the Pike test by: (1) following the United Haulers decisions
whenever a law does not discriminate between local and foreign private
firms; (2) examining whether the law is purposefully protectionist; and (3)
establishing a rebuttable presumption that the law is valid under the Pike
test when the burdens of local ordinances fall much more
heavily on local
302
customers or taxpayers than on out-of-state interests.
The Court's overuse of the per se test undermines federalist values by
ignoring the benefits of state and local laws. 30 3 An irony is that three
members of the Carbone majority-Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas-are avowed federalists who have often emphasized the importance of preserving traditional state authority; Justice O'Connor, who
concurred in Carbone, has similar federalist views. 30 4 Professor Fallon
has argued that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have often joined expansive DCCD decisions, because their "substantive conservatism... draws
them to view the Commerce Clause as embodying antiregulatory,
procompetitive ideals. 30 5 The collection and disposal of waste is a traditional local government function, but neither the Carbone majority nor
Justice O'Connor ever discussed the Court's federalist precedent in California Reduction and Gardner,both of which approved local waste mo298. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 627-28.
299. See supra notes 47, 105-14 and accompanying text.
300. Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 257-64; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 583-84.
301. McGreal, supra note 15, at 1217-22; supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
302. See infra text following note 330.
303. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 628-29.
304. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (emphasizing limits of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate matters that are within traditional areas of local or state
government responsibility; Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined the majority opinion); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (same; Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the majority
opinion; Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred and expressed similar
views); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same); Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivancesof Public Law, 77 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 523, 543-47, 552-55, 563,
590 (2003) (discussing and criticizing the Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress
Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits over Whether the Regulated Activity Is Private CommercialDevelopment or the Taking
of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 929, 950-51 (2004) (same).
305. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 470-71 (2002).
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nopolies, although neither case involved the Commerce Clause. 30 6 Even
more ironic is that Justices Scalia and Thomas believe that the Court's
DCCD is a mistake that the Court should abandon, but they voted in
favor of the expansive per se test in Carbone.30 7 In the near future, Justice Thomas is more likely than Justice Scalia to repudiate the Court's
precedent in this area. 30 8 With the recent arrival of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, there is some hope that the Court could reconsider its
broad use of the per se doctrine in light of giving states more flexibility in
managing waste issues.
In considering a facility's public benefits, courts should weigh likely
congressional policy in the area. As Justice O'Connor acknowledged in
her concurring opinion in Carbone, several provisions in RCRA and its
legislative history implied that Congress thought local communities
would use flow control measures to finance the recycling and incineration
facilities that the statute clearly encouraged local and state governments
to build. 30 9 Also, a court should realistically consider the advantages that
public facilities provide in serving congressional goals. Public waste facilities typically promote RCRA's preference for waste reduction, recycling,
and 3 incineration over cheaper, but less environmentally sound landfills. 10 Realistically, most public waste facilities will not be built unless
flow control laws provide a guaranteed minimum amount of waste. 3 11
When local laws favoring public or quasi-public facilities discriminate
equally against in-state and out-of-state private firms, such as the Clarkstown facility, the Court should apply the Pike test or perhaps a purposeful discrimination test or local burdens test, which is discussed below.
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Carbone and the two United
Haulers decisions, made a strong case for not applying the per se test to
local laws that favor public facilities but do not discriminate between local and out-of-state private firms. 3 12 Local laws that favor public facilities
are more likely to promote public values such as public health and the
environment than laws that simply promote local private firms. 313
B.

A REFORMULATED PIKE TEST

There has been disagreement among Supreme Court Justices about
when and how to apply the Pike test. In his concurring opinion in West
Lynn Creamery, Justice Scalia observed: "Once one gets beyond facial
discrimination our negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes
306. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
308. See id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
309. See C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 338, 408-10 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Diederich, supra note 78, at 186-95 (arguing that the RCRA
gives local governments a primary role in solid waste management); supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
310. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
312. United Haulers I, 261 F.3d 245, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2001).
313. Id.
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(and long has been) a 'quagmire.'" 314 Justice Scalia has argued that the
Pike test provides no guidance for how judges should balance competing
local and national interests so that the balancing is like "judging whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy. '3 15 Some commentators have proposed alternative balancing approaches that are more
refined. 3 16 There is a split among the circuits regarding whether a court
will "apply the ad hoc balancing scheme to all evenhanded statutes or
merely to those that result in disparate treatment between in-state and
'3 17
out-of-state interests.
In many of the cases in which a court has applied the Pike test and
invalidated a law, including Pike itself, the court was arguably striking
down the law because it had a discriminatory purpose. 3 18 Justice Souter
has argued that the Court does not "balance" competing local and interstate interests when it applies the Pike test:
[a]lthough this analysis of competing interests has sometimes been
called a 'balancing test,' it is not so much an open-ended weighing of
an ordinance's pros and cons, as an assessment of whether an ordinance discriminates in practice or otherwise unjustifiably operates
to
3 19
isolate a State's economy from the national common market.
In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, the Court acknowledged that "several
cases that have purported to apply the undue burden test (including Pike
itself) arguably turned in whole or in part on the discriminatory character
of the challenged state regulations .... -320 Courts might be consider a
law's possible discriminatory motives when they apply the Pike test, because this issue is arguably easier for a court to weigh than an open-ended
314. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959));
Mank, supra note 25, at 61.
315. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrul-IONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 5.3.5, at 424 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Pike balancing] has been criticized for being unpredictable
and arbitrary."); Mank, supra note 25, at 29, 61 (same).
316. Fox, supra note 30, at 209-13 (proposing rational basis test); Michael A. Lawrence,
Towards a More Coherent Dormant Commercial Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework,
21 HARv. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 395, 400, 420-29 (1998) (proposing a "Unitary Framework").
317. Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, ExtraterritorialState Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 483 &
n.130 (2003) (citing cases); Fox, supra note 30, at 178 (circuits have split on applying Pike);
see also O'Grady, supra note 32, at 632-33
(Although the Supreme Court and the majority of lower courts apply Pike's
flexible balancing test to all local legislation, a minority of circuit courts have
adopted the position advanced in this Article that the only burdens suitable
for analysis under the balancing test are burdens that actually "discriminate"
against interstate commerce.).
318. Fox, supra note 30, at 179, 189; Mank, supra note 25, at 29, 61-62; Regan, supra
note 33, at 1212-20.
319. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Lawrence, supra note 316, at 428-29 (discussing criticism of Pike balancing test
by Justice Souter); Mank, supra note 25, at 29, 61; Regan, supra note 33, at 1092 (arguing
Pike test is concerned with preventing purposeful economic protectionism).
320. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 n.12 (1997); Mank, supra note 25, at
61.
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balancing test. 321

In light of federalist principles that encourage states to act as laboratories to test new ways to solve social problems, 322 courts should apply the
Pike test in a deferential manner unless a significant purpose of the law is
aimed at protecting local private interests at the expense of foreign competition or unless most of the law's burdens fall on foreign residents or
firms. For example, the Pike Court indicated that courts applying its test
should consider the availability of alternatives that have less of an impact
on interstate commerce, stating that whether a burden on interstate commerce would be tolerated depends on the "nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. ' 323 There is a strong argument that courts
should apply a more deferential approach to alternatives for nondiscriminatory laws rather than subjecting them to the strict per se test. 32 4 If the

Supreme Court considers recycling to be less effective than a ban on the
sale of plastic nonreturnable milk containers, 325 courts should also consider that many states have adopted flow control ordinances, because it is
unrealistic to fund expensive recycling or incineration facilities without a
326
minimum guaranteed volume of waste.
In applying the Pike test, courts should defer to the means selected by
local governments if they are based on local political or social realities
rather than on an effort to squelch foreign firms. For example, although
it was theoretically correct that Clarkstown could have financed the project through taxes or bonds, the Carbone decision and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion failed to consider the substantial political obstacles
and costs in using taxes or bonds rather than a flow control ordinance for
financing the project. The Carbone majority and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion mentioned the use of bonds to finance these facilities, but
it is difficult to justify a long-term bond to build an expensive facility
without a guaranteed minimum volume of waste. 327 For instance, in SSC
321. Regan, supra note 33, at 1092, 1093-95 (arguing Court should not use a balancing
test in applying Pike test but "should be concerned only with preventing purposeful protectionism."); Verchick, supra note 29, at 1269-70 (same); supra note 318 and accompanying
text.
322. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) ("The
science of government ... is the science of experiment"); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce
Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1994) (explaining that the Commerce Clause is a "natural laboratory" for federalism).
323. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Fox, supra note 30, at 204-05.
324. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 315, § 5.3.5, at 420 ("The Court never has invalidated a
nondiscriminatory state law on the ground that the goal could be achieved through a
means that is less burdensome on interstate commerce."); Fox, supra note 30, at 204-06.
325. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981).
326. Supra note 85 and accompanying text.
327. See Diederich, supra note 78, at 190-91, 223-24; McCauliff, supra note 59, at 650,
656-57.
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Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, "the towns financed construction of the incinerator through tax-free bonds issued by the New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation, a public authority," but the bonds were
"secured primarily by a twenty-five year contractual obligation of
Smithtown and Huntington to reimburse Ogden for the construction and
operation costs of the incinerator. '328 Without a flow control ordinance,
the towns could not have signed the long term contract with the private
operator necessary to secure the bond funding. Without a flow control
ordinance guaranteeing a minimum flow, the only practical way to pay
for expensive public waste facilities is through taxes, but taxes for such
facilities are often politically unpopular and unrealistic. 32 9 The free collection or disposal of waste through taxation should not be the only option left to local governments given the understandable reluctance of
local voters to impose heavy tax burdens on themselves. The Carbone
majority should have applied the Pike test rather than the per se test
considering the fact that over twenty states had enacted laws authorizing
local or regional flow control ordinances as evidence that this method was
strongly preferred by many states as the only practical means to build
330
needed waste facilities.
In light of all the problems with the Court's application of the Pike test,
the United Haulers decisions provide a first step in limiting the Supreme
Court's overuse of the per se test and reformulating the Pike test to make
it more workable. Whenever a law does not discriminate between local
and foreign private firms, courts should follow the United Haulers decisions and apply the more deferential Pike review standard, not the per se
standard, to determine if the law imposes more than incidental burdens
on interstate commerce and whether the law's benefits significantly outweigh any burdens to foreign interests. Additionally, to help guide its
application of the Pike test, courts should consider whether the local government had a discriminatory purpose in mind, as opposed to legitimate
health and safety concerns, and whether the local burdens are greater or
smaller than the burdens on interstate commerce.
C. A

DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE TEST

Some justices and commentators have argued that the Court should
reformulate the DCCD to examine whether a local law is purposefully
protectionist, not simply incidentally discriminatory in effect, because the
Court's primary focus in DCCD cases has been on invalidating laws that
328. SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1995).
329. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 428-29 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (observing "[w]aste disposal with minimal environmental damage requires serious capital investment.., and there are limits on any municipality's ability to incur debt or
to finance facilities out of tax revenues"); McCauliff, supra note 59, at 663, 672-73 (arguing
that it is difficult to convince voters to pay taxes for waste facilities).
330. See supra notes 75, 311 and accompanying text.
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seek to advantage local firms at the expense of foreign competition. 331
Justice Souter in his Carbone dissent argued that all or almost all of the
Court's prior cases invalidating local laws under the DCCD involved purposeful discrimination. 332 He argued, "With perhaps one exception, the
laws invalidated in those cases were patently discriminatory, differentiating by their very terms between in-state and out-of-state (or local and
nonlocal) processors. ' 333 The purposeful discrimination approach was
the standard in earlier Court decisions, including Dean and Hood, both of
which carefully considered the local government's health and safety rationale for the challenged law, though both ultimately concluded that the
laws were invalid because they had the underlying purpose of favoring
local producers of milk. 334 In 1994, the same year that it decided Carbone, the Court in West Lynn Creamery stated that recent cases "have
eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and
effects. '335 The West Lynn Creamery decision demonstrates that the
Court can consider a local law's purposes and effects without repudiating
its precedent. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas and Ginsburg, argued in his dissenting opinion that even a
facially discriminatory law could be valid under the Clause if it were enacted for an appropriate purpose, stating, "The most remarkable thing
about today's judgment is that it is rendered without inquiry into whether
the purposes of the tax exemption justify its favoritism .... Facially discriminatory or not, the exemption is [not] an artifice of economic
336
protectionism.,
The Court should abandon the rigid per se approach of Carbone, and
reformulate the Pike test to include consideration of a law's likely motives, as well as its relative benefits and burdens.
According to Professor O'Grady,
331. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 575, 587-03 (arguing that the primary DCCD concern
should be the "long-recognized prohibition against resident economic protectionism"); Regan, supra note 33, at 1092-95 (same); Verchick, supra note 29, at 1269-70 (same); but see
Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in Interstate
Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REV. 381, 419-21, 428 (1995) (rejecting purposeful discrimination
approach of Professor Regan and arguing that the Court in DCCD cases "should approach
all commercial activity with an inquiry about the real discrimination in effect").
332. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 414-15.
333. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Souter discussed whether Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) was patently discriminatory. Carbone, 511
U.S. at 415 n.2.
334. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (striking down a city
ordinance banning the local sale of milk that had not been pasteurized and bottled within
five miles of the city center); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535, 538-39
(1949) (stating the rule against purposeful economic favoritism but acknowledging that
states may "impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and
safety"); Verchick, supra note 29, at 1269-70, 1272, 1310 n.185, 1306-09 (stating Dean and
Hood examined law's purpose).
335. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994).
336. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 602-03 (1997)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); KENDALL ET AL., supra note 35, at 88-89.
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Reviewing a statute for economic protectionism differs from a discrimination-focused review in three fundamental respects: (1) a protectionism determination does not require a court to engage in the
precise comparisons of similarly situated classifications demanded by
a discrimination review, (2) a review for protectionism focuses directly on legislative purpose, (3) a review for protectionism permits a
reviewing court to consider
the magnitude of a statute's impact on
337
interstate commerce.
Thus, a court using a protectionist test, instead of the per se test, can
consider a law's motives and actual impact on interstate commerce.
In light of federalist principles respectful of state autonomy, some commentators would place the burden on the challenger to prove that a law
that has an apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose actually has
an underlying discriminatory purpose to advantage local private firms at
the expense of foreign competition. 338 Protectionist behavior would be
defined as "the imposition of tariffs, embargoes, quotas, and the like, for
the purpose of protecting local producers (farmers, manufacturers, laborers) against foreign competition. '339 A law having protectionist effects
would not automatically be considered discriminatory. Professor Regan
has argued, "Protectionist effect does not make a statute protectionist...
nor does protectionist effect have any constitutional significance in itself.
The Court both is and should be concerned with purpose. Protectionist
effect is significant evidence on the issue of protectionist purpose; but it is
just that, evidence and no more. '340 He further argues that it is much
easier for a judge to determine a law's purpose than to apply the Pike
balancing test.341 A court would examine whether protectionist motivations by the legislature more likely than not "contributed substantially"
to the adoption of the challenged law or any important component of the
2
law.

34

A significant argument against using a purpose or motive based test for
the DCCD is that the Court has avoided explicitly considering these issues because of the complex evidentiary issues involved and an unwillingness to publicly accuse officials of such behavior. 343 However, the Court
337. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 589-603.
338. Lawrence, supra note 316, at 416, 422; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 634; Regan,
supra note 33, at 1095, 1148.
339. Regan, supra note 33, at 1112.
340. Id. at 1095.
341. Id. at 1143-54; see also O'Grady, supra note 32, at 597-98 (arguing that a DCCD
review of "protectionist concerns is often an uncomplicated task").
342. Regan, supra note 33, at 1148-51 ("the court should strike down a state law if and
only if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of
the legislators contributed substantially to the adoption of the law or any feature of the
law."); O'Grady, supra note 32, at 599 ("Thus, state legislation will be 'protectionist' under
the definition of protectionism offered here if the record indicates that it was substantially
motivated by the need to protect resident economic interests, or, if in an attempt to address
legitimate concerns, the state isolates itself from the national economy in a way that affects
interstate commerce.").
343. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 594-98 (listing objections to motive review, but arguing
for motive review); Regan, supra note 33, at 1285-86 (same).
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has in fact implicitly considered motive, sometimes by questioning the
local government's expressed rationale for a law. 34 4 When it claims to be
balancing under Pike, the Court is often considering motive or
345
purpose.
Most flow control ordinances are not purposefully discriminatory. The
usual objections to import or export restrictions do not apply to flow control ordinances. One might argue that flow control ordinances that require waste to be sent to only in-state facilities are purposefully
protectionist, because they embargo the flow of waste to out-of-state facilities and isolate the flow control jurisdiction from the national market. 346 Protectionist laws that isolate a state from national markets
usually are implicitly hostile to other jurisdictions. 34 7 By contrast, flow
control ordinances that discriminate equally against local and of out-ofstate private firms do not provoke hostility and retaliation from other
states. 348 It is notable that twenty-three state attorneys general filed amicus briefs supporting Clarkstown in the Carbone case, but not a single
349
state supported Carbone's challenge.
For public waste facilities, there is usually no attempt "to advantage
local actors at the expense of their foreign competitors. '350 Indeed, the
primary burden of most flow control laws falls on local residents. 3 51 Instead, local governments are attempting to address a flaw in the waste
market that hinders the construction of expensive incinerators or recycling facilities without the guarantee of a minimum waste flow. 352 For
flow control ordinances requiring the use of public waste facilities, the
purpose is to promote the public heath and safety by permitting comprehensive waste reduction, recycling, and incineration of waste to avoid dis-3
35
posing of it in landfills, which are major goals of the RCRA.
Furthermore, since interstate waste disposal generally causes harm because waste is sent to poorer, more rural and polluted states, flow control
ordinances actually benefit other jurisdictions by reducing harmful waste
in those states. 354 Accordingly, flow control ordinances that discriminate
344. Regan, supra note 33, at 1224-25, 1285-86; see Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977) (questioning law's "ostensible consumer protection purpose").
345. Regan, supra note 33, at 1286.
346. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 588, 607-08.
347. Id. at 593.
348. United Haulers I, 261 F.3d 245, 261 (2d Cir. 2001).
349. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
350. Regan, supra note 33, at 1095.
351. See supra notes 151, 165 and infra note 392 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 81, 88-91 and accompanying text.
354. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dept. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 372-73
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (writing that "the laws of economics suggest that landfills will
sprout in places where land is cheapest and population densities least."); Engel, supra note
90, at 1493-94 & app. (presenting empirical data that states that are net waste importers are
poorer, more rural and more polluted than net exporting states); Verchick, supra note 29,
at 1247-48, 1294-97 (discussing policy implications of Engel's empirical findings).
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equally against local and of out-of-state private firms are not purposefully
discriminatory to foreign jurisdictions.
Flow control ordinances that require the use of public facilities are similar to laws requiring refundable deposits on beverage containers in that
they seek to protect the environment rather than to advantage local firms
at the expense of foreign firms. In American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor
Control Commission, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon statute that required a specified refundable de355
posit on beverage containers to reduce litter and solid waste disposal.
Out-of-state container makers argued that the two-cent refund for standardized containers advantaged local bottlers, but the court found that
the scheme gave an advantage to manufacturers who were closer to retail
outlets regardless of whether they were in-state or out-of-state for the
legitimate reason of facilitating the redemption of the containers rather
than for discriminatory purposes. 356 Applying the Pike test, the Oregon
court concluded that the law served the legitimate purpose of reducing
environmental waste, which was consistent with federal environmental
statutes, that it was non-discriminatory, that it imposed only incidental
burdens on interstate commerce, and, therefore, that the law was constitutional.35 7 Under a proper federalist system, federal courts should allow
a state such as Oregon to adopt legislation with the predominant purpose
of serving important public goals such as preserving the environment,
even if there are some incidental burdens on interstate commerce. 358 The
American Can court stated, "[The Commerce Clause] was not meant to
usurp the police power of the states which was reserved under the Tenth
Amendment. '' 359 Flow control ordinances that require the use of public
facilities are similar in that their predominant purpose is to serve environmental goals rather than advantage local firms at the expense of foreign
firms.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Supreme Court upheld
statute prohibiting the sale of milk in plastic non-returnable
Minnesota
a
to
serve environmental and energy conservation purposes. 36°
containers
Applying the Pike test, the Court held that the statute did not violate the
Commerce Clause, because it did not discriminate against out-of-state
sellers, the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce because
Minnesota's requirements were different from other states was relatively
minor and was not clearly excessive in light of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other natural resources and
easing solid waste disposal problems, and no approach with a lesser im355.
1973).
356.
357.
n.169.
358.
359.
360.

Am. Can. Co. v. Or. Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 702-03 (Or. Ct. App.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 696-703; Regan, supra note 33, at 1116-19; Verchick, supra note 29, at 1269
Regan, supra note 33, at 1118-19.
Am. Can, 517 P.2d at 696.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).

2007]

Adopting a New Standard of Review

pact on interstate activities was available. 36 1 The Court found the Minnesota statute valid even though it imposed some incidental burdens on
foreign producers for whom it was cheaper to make plastic non-returnable containers than to change its production methods for a single market. 362 The Court implied that a state may incidentally harm foreign
businesses as long as the primary goal is to advance a legitimate state
purpose and any harm to interstate commerce is not a significant purpose
of the law. 363 The Court focused on the statute's primary purpose of promoting conservation and reducing waste and did not actually balance 3its
64
costs and benefits, despite referring to balancing under the Pike test.
Applying a deferential rational basis review of the law, the Court stated
that it was not its role "to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation,"
or to "substitute [its] evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature." 365 If the Supreme Court in evaluating alternatives can consider
that recycling is less effective than a ban on the sale of plastic non-returnable milk containers, 36 6 courts should also consider that many states have
adopted flow control ordinances, because it is unrealistic to fund expensive recycling or incineration facilities without a minimum guaranteed
volume of waste.
If a tax or law is evenhanded, the Court has rejected DCCD challenges
even if most of the burden falls on foreign residents or firmS. 367 In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, the Court upheld a severance tax on
coal that made no distinction between in-state and out-of-state coal even
though ninety percent of Montana's coal is sent to out-of-state buyers and
hence ninety percent of the burden of the tax falls on foreign purchasers. 368 In a 2005 decision, American Trucking Ass'n v. Michigan Public
Service Commission, the Court held that a Michigan law imposing a flat
$100 fee upon all trucks engaged in intrastate commercial hauling transactions did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises, because it applied evenhandedly to all carriers
making domestic journeys, even though it imposed a higher burden per
369
mile on the average out-of-state truck than the average in-state truck.
In light of cases where the Court has upheld neutral laws that in fact
place heavier burdens on foreign interests, a flow control ordinance that
neutrally discriminates against all in-state and out-of-state private firms
should not be subject to the per se test, unless there is evidence of an
actual purpose to discriminate against foreign firms.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at 471-74.
Id.
Regan, supra note 33, at 1127-28.
Id. at 1240-41.
Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 469-70; Fox, supra note 30, at 194-95.
See, e.g., Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473-74.
Id. at 1165-74.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1981).
Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2421-26 (2005).
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PRESUME THAT A LOCAL ORDINANCE IS VALID IF LOCAL
CITIZENS BEAR MOST OF THE BURDENS

Another possible test that is generally consistent with the Pike test is
whether local citizens bear most of the burdens of a local ordinance. In
his Carbone dissent, Justice Souter argued that the Court has implicitly
applied a standard of presumptively invalidating laws that primarily burden foreigners; therefore, the Court should also treat laws that primarily
burden local residents as presumptively valid. 370 For example, the
Court's decision in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,371 which invalidated an Alaska law requiring that timber sold by
the State of Alaska be processed by in-state mills, emphasized that the
law was discriminatory because its "'burden falls principally upon those
without the state." 3 72 Justice Souter explained, "Requiring that Alaskan
timber be milled in that State prior to export would add the value of the
milling service to the Alaskan economy at the expense of some other
'373
State, but would not burden the Alaskans who adopted such a law.
He contended that the Court has focused on laws that increase the price
of exported goods, because a law whose burden falls "'principally upon
those without the state ... is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state."' 374 He maintained, "The Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown from
themselves. '3 75 Thus, a local burdens test would satisfy the concern of
''process protection" advocates that people should not be burdened by
laws over which they have no political influence or vote. 376 Professor
Verchick argues that from the 1930s until the 1980s "the Court examined
the burdens on outsiders compared to insiders," but that the Court
stopped doing this as it adopted the free market approach to the DCCD
exemplified by Carbone.377 Thus, adopting a local burdens test would in
many ways return the Court to long standing precedent.
Similarly, Professor Gergen has argued that that the focus of courts in
DCCD cases should be on "state laws of disutility," which he defines as
370. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 411, 417, 422, 424-29
(1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
371. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
372. Id. at 92.
373. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 425 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing cf. S.-Cent. Timber, 467
U.S. at 92).
374. Id. at 426 (quoting S.-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 92).
375. Id. at 430; Cox, supra note 51, at 185.
376. Commentators have disagreed about whether a process protection rationale does
or should underlie the DCCD. Compare Verchick, supra note 29, at 1251-58, 1265-66 (arguing process protection rationale both does and should underlie the DCCD), with
O'Grady, supra note 32, at 623-26 ("Exclusive reliance on a process-based analysis to evaluate local legislation is problematic because it is not always a consistent or reliable indicator of either protectionist or discriminatory local legislation."); Regan, supra note 33, at
1161-67 (rejecting a process-based analysis as overly broad and insensitive to state autonomy in a federalist system).
377. Verchick, supra note 29, at 1266.
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"laws that enrich states but at greater expense to out-of-staters or the
nation. '378 Additionally, other commentators have argued that laws that
primarily burden out-of-region interests are presumptively discriminatory
379 Thus, if
unless the government can provide a sufficient justification.
courts and commentators agree that laws that primarily burden foreigners
are suspect under the Clause, then laws whose primary burden falls on instate residents should generally receive favorable review under the Pike
test. A local burdens test addresses the fundamental purpose of the
DCCD, which is to prevent protectionist legislation that imposes barriers
and interstate commerce to the benefit
and burdens on foreign 3interests
80
of selfish local interests.
The Court has considered who bears the primary burden of a regulation in deciding its validity under the DCCD.38 1 For example, in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court found that New Jersey's law banning out-of-state waste from its landfills violated the DCCD, because the
law was "an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's remaining
landfill sites."'382 In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, the Court considered the restrictions that Nebraska imposed on its own citizens in using
groundwater in evaluating the constitutionality of the state's restrictions
on interstate transfers of groundwater. 383 The Court observed that "a
state that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to
prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State. An exemption for interstate transfers would be inconsistent with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation. '' 384 The Sporhase decision explained, "For
Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety
regulation, on the other. ' 385 The Supreme Court has upheld discrimina378. Mark P. Gergen, Territorialityand the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735,

1740-41 (1988).
379. Lawrence, supra note 316, at 417, 423-26; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 600.
380. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 626-27 (arguing that the primary purpose of the DCCD
is to prevent economic protectionism); Regan, supra note 33, at 1092, 1113-14, 1165.
381. In Camps NewfoundlOwatonna v. Town of Harrison,520 U.S. 564, 581 (1997), the

Court stated that "[a] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it
crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State." See id. at 580-81 (invalidating, under the Commerce Clause, a discriminatory real property tax exemption, because
it "functionally serves as an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the
businesses that principally serve them."). See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642
(1984) (invalidating manufacturing tax exemption which discriminated against out-of-state
manufacturers).
382. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978); Regan, supra note 33, at
1121.
383. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 955-56 (1982). Although recognizing that some state restrictions on the export of groundwater are valid, the Court
invalidated the Nebraska statute because it contained a reciprocity provision that required
other states to make a reciprocity agreement with Nebraska to obtain its groundwater. Id.
at 956-58.
384. Id. at 955-56.
385. Id. at 956.
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tory taxes that theoretically favor local firms if they do not actually harm
out-of-state firms, because they compete in a different market. 386 Under
a local burdens analysis, the flow control ordinances at issue in Carbone,
United Haulers, and Daviess County would all be presumptively constitutional, because local residents bear most of the costs of the respective
ordinance and the laws all seek to advance legitimate public health
387
concerns.
Because the Pike test already considers or balances a law's impacts on
interstate commerce and local commerce, a local burdens test is generally
consistent with the Pike standard. One possible difference is that a local
burdens test would be easier to apply, because it focuses on one factor,
whereas the Pike test balances or considers at least two factors. In most
circumstances where the majority of a law's local burdens fall on local
residents, the law will usually have minimal burdens on interstate commerce and thus would pass the Pike test. The local burdens test could be
used as a complement to the Pike test to give judges a simple rule when
laws are presumptively valid under the Pike standard. Because the most
important purpose of the DCCD is to protect out-of-state interests from
parochial discrimination, 388 it makes little sense to invalidate legislation
that primarily burdens local interests. The classic example of economic
protectionism is a law that explicitly favors local private firms at the ex389
pense of foreign private firms.
The purpose of flow control ordinances is to reduce the amount of local
waste and ensure its proper recycling or treatment, and such controls are
generally not intended to harm foreign interests. 390 The Carbone Court
failed to recognize that there is a difference between laws that impose a
ban or tariff on importing foreign waste into a local jurisdiction, which is
a burden on foreign importers, and a flow control ordinance that requires
a minimum amount of waste to go to designated landfills to finance
needed waste facilities. For a flow control ordinance, the predominant
motive is ensuring sufficient waste so local communities can afford to invest in recycling facilities or incinerators that, under RCRA's criteria, are
environmentally superior to simply land-filling waste. 391 Local communities bear the primary costs of paying extra tipping fees to operate these
facilities and do so by choice rather than selecting cheaper but more envi39 2
ronmentally harmful alternatives such as landfills.
386. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997); Alaska v. Arctic Maid,
366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961); McGreal, supra note 15, at 1217-22.
387. Verchick, supra note 29, at 1265-66 (arguing that the burdens in Carbone were
local and not discriminatory under the DCCD).
388. Regan, supra note 33, at 1165 ("The states may not single out foreigners for disadvantageous treatment just because of their foreignness.").
389. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 416-17 (1994) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Regan, supra note 33, at 1138.
390. Id.; supra Pt. II.B.
391. Diederich, supra note 78, at 223-24.
392. O'Grady, supra note 32, at 607 (arguing that flow control ordinances clearly place
heaviest burden on local residents); supra note 85-87 and accompanying text.
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On balance, flow control ordinances can actually protect the environment of other states by preventing the need for waste to be sent to out-ofstate landfills. The Carbone majority argued that it was inappropriate for
Clarkstown to consider the environment of foreign jurisdictions, because
such concerns inappropriately extended the "town's police power beyond
its jurisdictional bounds," 39 3 but this argument is specious. There is nothing in the Commerce Clause that should prevent a state or local government from taking actions that benefit other states, unless Congress
explicitly prohibits such actions for other reasons. 394 Concern for other
states is fully consistent with federalist principles. In light of its earlier
waste cases prohibiting import bans, Carbone is an anomalous decision,
because there was no actual evidence of harm to foreign markets and the
burdens primarily fell on local residents. 395 While import bans are discriminatory and allow states to "hoard" landfill space at the expense of
foreign interests, the export restrictions imposed by flow control ordinances reduce a harmful product and thereby are beneficial to foreign
jurisdictions that no longer have to landfill the waste now subject to flow
3 96
control restrictions.
There will be some cases where it is more difficult to weigh the extent
of local versus national burdens. For example, a tariff typically burdens
3 97
both local consumers and foreign firms to benefit local private firms.
Because a tariff is purposeful discrimination and usually imposes significant burdens on foreign firms, tariffs should be presumptively invalid. In
a close case, a court could err on the side of invalidating a challenged law,
because it would likely have a significant burden on interstate commerce. 398 Erring on the side of invalidating laws that are at least moderately burdensome to interstate trade or foreign interests is consistent with
the Pike test.
E.

A COMBINATION TEST
To avoid overly broad use of the per se test, whenever a publiclyowned facility discriminates equally against in-state and out-of-state businesses, courts should follow the United Haulers decisions and presumptively apply the Pike test. Additionally, when they apply the Pike test,
courts should explicitly consider issues of discriminatory purpose and the
relative local burden when they assess a local law's burdens on interstate
commerce and when they weigh whether the law's benefits outweigh the
burdens.
393. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. From a policy perspective, the farther trash is moved,
the greater the risk of spills and contamination. Davies, supra note 34, at 259.
394. Regan, supra note 33, at 1127, 1133 (providing an example where "Wisconsin
passes a law forbidding the sale of alcohol in Wisconsin to Illinois residents (but not Wisconsin residents) under twenty-one" to help Illinois advance its policy of prohibiting drinking by those under twenty-one as consistent with federalist values).
395. See supra notes 151-54, 165 and accompanying text.
396. Diederich, supra note 78, at 221-26.
397. Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 253.
398. Cox, supra note 51, at 172; O'Grady, supra note 32, at 601-02.
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CONCLUSION

When it decides United Haulers, the Supreme Court should re-think
Carbone's overly broad definition of discrimination. The Court is unlikely
to radically change its approach to the DCCD. Based on its precedent,
the Court is likely to continue to use both the per se test and the Pike
test. A first step toward change would be for the Court to adopt the
United Haulers decisions' presumptive use of the Pike test where public
facilities have an effective monopoly, but are non-discriminatory in how
they treat local and out-of-state private firms. The Supreme Court at
where
times has recognized that the per se test should apply only to cases 399
a law discriminates between in-state and out-of-state competitors.
The Court should supplement the Pike test by also considering the purposeful discrimination and the local burden tests.4°° For instance, the
Court could ask whether the local government in building the public facility had the general purpose of serving the public interest or really intended, as in many of the Court's milk cases from the last century, to
promote local interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. 40 1 Finally, the Court could determine whether the law's burdens fall primarily
on local residents. 40 2 These changes would enable the Court to establish
a DCCD that is more realistic in evaluating local laws' actual benefits to
society and burdens on interstate commerce than the current per se test
hinders the free market is
that assumes that any law that40 theoretically
3
automatically unconstitutional.
In applying the Pike balancing test, the Court should adopt certain rebuttable presumptions to help it decide a DCCD case. First, a law that
does not discriminate between local and foreign private firms is presumptively non-discriminatory and should be reviewed under the Pike test.
Second, if a substantial majority of the law's burdens fall on local residents, there should be a presumption of non-discrimination and that the
law is not "hoarding" resources from other states.
Justice O'Connor's concern in Carbone that the national market in
waste would be harmed if many jurisdictions adopted similar legislation is
a legitimate point to raise,40 4 but flow control ordinances that do not discriminate between local private firms and foreign firms are likely to have
net societal benefits and will not harm foreign interests on the whole.
Although state protectionist programs are generally inefficient, flow control ordinances are economically efficient in many cases, because they the
provide incentives for local governments to build necessary facilities such
as incinerators and recycling facilities. 40 5 Because local residents bear
399. McGreal, supra note 15, at 1217-22; supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 72, 387-89 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
404. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S 383, 406-07 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
405. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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most of the costs of flow control ordinances, there is little harm to foreign
jurisdictions. 40 6 Furthermore, there may be a net benefit to foreign jurisdictions because of a reduction in harmful waste, especially to poor, rural,
heavily polluted states. 40 7 The Carbone majority wrongly refused to consider the ordinance's benefits to the national environment. 40 8 In a federalist system, a state or local government should be able to consider the
positive benefits of a law to other jurisdictions. 40 9 Both Justice Souter, in
his dissenting opinion in Carbone, and the Second Circuit, in the two
United Haulers decisions, made strong arguments that the public flow
control ordinances at issue were non-discriminatory between local and
foreign private firms, conferred many social benefits, and imposed costs
mainly on local residents rather than on out-of-state interests. 410 Thus,
under a modified Pike balancing test that considers whether a law discriminates between local and foreign private firms and assesses the relative local benefits and burdens of a law, the flow control ordinances in
Carbone, United Haulers and Daviess County should be constitutional.
The Supreme Court should affirm the Second Circuit's decision in United
Haulers II.

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Carbone, 511 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 393.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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